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Salafi Madrasas: Ideology, Transformation, and Implication for Multiculturalism in Indonesia

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Abstrak

Kecurigaan terhadap Salafi sebagai organisasi teroris dan ekstremis meningkat pasca 9/11. Beberapa riset tentang ideologi Salafi memuat doktrin wahabisme yang eksklusif dan keras. Artikel ini mengkaji tentang madrasah Salafi yang mulanya bersifat eksklusif, kaku, konservatif dan anti terhadap simbol-simbol negara, kemudian bertransformasi menjadi sekolah Islam formal yang modern dan profesional secara manajemen, serta mengintegrasikan antara kurikulum pendidikan nasional dengan kurikulum keislaman (*diniyyah/boarding school*) sebagai strategi untuk mendapatkan pengakuan negara. Meski tidak dilakukan di semua lembaga pendidikan Islam yang dikelolanya, namun transformasi madrasah Salafi ini dimaksudkan untuk menghapus kecurigaan masyarakat yang menyebutnya sebagai kelompok teroris dan ekstrimis. Sebab itu, artikel ini juga menjelaskan tipologi Salafi yang terbagi menjadi dua berdasarkan model gerakannya, yaitu Salafi Ideologis (Purifikasi) dan Salafi Jihadis. Melalui pendekatan pendidikan multikultural yang ditekankan Bikhu Parekh, riset ini mengemukakan implikasi atas ide-ide salafisme yang terdesiminasikan kepada masyarakat Indonesia yang multikultural. Riset ini menemukan bahwa kampanye Salafi di Indonesia tidak sepenuhnya mengalami kegagalan. Madrasah-madrasah Salafi berhasil bertransformasi melalui integrasi

kurikulum yang bertujuan untuk menolak kecurigaan publik yang menyebutnya sebagai organisasi teroris, bahkan dengan strategi ini justru menarik masyarakat kelas menengah atas untuk menyekolahkan anak-anaknya ke madrasah Salafi.

Kata Kunci: Extremisme, Multikulturalisme, pendidikan Islam, salafi

Abstract

Suspicion of Salafi as terrorist and extremist organization increased after 9/11. Many studies have found that the Salafi ideology contains an exclusive and harsh doctrine of Wahhabism. This article examines the Salafi madrasas which was initially exclusive, rigid, conservative, and anti-state symbols, then transformed into a formal Islamic school that is modern and professional in management, as well as integrating the national education curriculum with Islamic curriculum (*diniyyah*/boarding school) as a strategy to gain state recognition. Although it is not carried out in all Islamic educational institutions it manages, the transformation of the Salafi madrasas is intended to remove the suspicions of the people who consider them terrorist and extremist group. Therefore, this article also explains the Salafi typology which is divided into two based on the movement model, namely the Ideological Salafi (Purification) and the Jihadist Salafi. Through the multicultural education approach that was written by Bikhu Parekh, this research suggests the implications of the ideas of salafism that are disseminated to the multicultural Indonesian society. This research finds that the Salafi campaign in Indonesia has not completely failed. Salafi madrasas have succeeded in transforming through curriculum integration which aims to reject public suspicion that they are terrorist organizations, in fact this strategy actually attracts upper-middle class people to send their children to Salafi madrasas.

Keywords: Extremism, Islamic education, multiculturalism, Salafi

Introduction

Infiltration of Salafi ideology began to occur in Indonesia in the early 1980s. The presence of Salafis is marked by the appearance of young people who appear different from Indonesian Muslim youths in general. They keep their beards (*lihyah*), wear robes (*jalabiyah*), wear turbans (*imamah*), and wear pants above the ankles (*isbal*). Salafi activists hold Islamic studies (*halaqah*) in mosques, prayer rooms, and in student boarding houses. They form communities such as hidden enclaves consisting of 8 to 10 people. Salafi activists have an exclusive, rigid, literal Islamic view, rejecting logic and the role of mind (Muthohirin, 2014).

Salafis are mapped into three major factions. Those are Ideological (Purified) Salafis, Political Salafis and Salafi Jihadists (Wiktorowicz, 2006). Salafi ideological factions are very distant from politics. They emphasize their movement on the purification of Islam, such as the behavior of the Muslim community mixed with tradition, rationality in religion, and heresy. This faction prioritizes Islamic education (*tarbiyyah*) rather than through violent

means. Meanwhile, political factions consider the political arena as a space to fight for justice for Muslims through laws. Then, the Jihadist faction is a Salafist group that is more militant, uses violent means, and seeks an Islamic revolutionary movement (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

Ideological Salafis and Salafi Jihadists are growing and developing in Indonesia. Ideological Salafis disseminate the ideas of Salafism through establishment of schools, madrasas and Islamic boarding schools. Meanwhile, Salafi Jihadists manifest themselves in the form of terrorist organizations such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) and various other terrorist groups. JI became the main actor in the first Bali Bombing terrorism which killed 202 people in 2002 (Yumitro, Kurniawati, & Saiman, 2018). Various acts of terrorism continued with more sophisticated strategic transformations in the following years. The chain of the Salafi Jihadist movement has never died until now. In fact, in 2010, Indonesia became the second country where the terrorism movement developed well after Afghanistan (Pringle, 2010). The background and factors for the repeated emergence of terrorism and violent extremism are quite diverse, ranging from the economic crisis, hatred of certain identities, national security, to distorted religious interpretations (Djelantik, 2013).

After these acts of terrorism, the media and scholars from within and outside the country highlighted the involvement of madrasas and Islamic boarding schools. They are worried about the involvement of madrasas in Indonesia in indoctrinating the ideology of terrorism. Some research reports even compare Indonesia to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Taliban emerged from madrasas close to refugee camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border between the 1980s and 1990s (Azra, Afrianty, & Hefner, 2007). However, those concerns have not been proven in the last two decades. Only very few Islamic boarding schools or madrasas are indicated by terrorist networks. This is because in general pesantren and madrasas have resilience to violent extremism (Muthohirin & Suherman, 2020), contribute to religious moderation, give birth to many national figures, and provide access to proper education for poor children in rural areas (Sunhaji, 2017).

On the other hand, Salafi madrasas in Indonesia have a variety of styles in line with the dynamics of global politics and economics, as well as the traditions and culture of the community where Salafi schools are established. Many Salafi madrasas are managed on a limited basis by relying on financial

donations from the Middle East. Consequently, these madrasa must accept and implement the Islamic curriculum originating from the Imam Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University, Saudi Arabia (Commins, 2006) (Hasan, 2010b), does not become a formal and exclusive school, and only teaches Arabic, purification of Islam, as well as various books of Tawheed and Akidah by classical scholars with Wahhabi tradition. This fact is suspected as an attempt by Saudi Arabia to campaign for Wahhabi religious understanding globally.

However, as an effort to respond to growing suspicions following the rise of terrorism, many Salafi madrasas are managed in a modern and professional manner, and do not depend on financial donations from the Middle East. Although it has undergone significant changes in terms of management, it still looks exclusive in terms of Islamic teaching. Salafis – previously known to stay away from public affairs – responded to these suspicions by rebranding their educational institutions by integrating the Salafi madrasas curriculum with the national education curriculum. They manage educational institutions ranging from *madrasas*, Islamic elementary schools, Islamic junior high schools, Islamic high schools (integrated), *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), to Islamic religious high schools (*Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam*). All levels of Islamic education are managed in the form of formal schools, which means obtaining a decree on the establishment of Islamic educational institutions from the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. In Noorhaidi Hasan's opinion, the goal of Salafis in transforming the movement is none other than to attract the sympathy of Muslims after the outbreak of acts of terrorism and other religious-based extremism by continuing to campaign for salafist ideas, as well as to reject opinions that consider them to be part of radical groups and terrorist (Hasan, 2010b).

First of all, this study describes the typology of the ideological Salafi movement that self-excludes and builds the movement through Islamic education (*tarbiyyah*) into a different faction of the movement, with an orientation to terrorism (jihadism). Then, this article also more specifically explains the transformation of Salafis after being identified as part of a radical group because of instilling the ideas of Islamic Wahhabism/Salafism. This study focuses on the discussion of Salafi Islamic education, which has been transformed into a madrasa which is managed in a modern and professional manner so that it attracts the attention of urban Muslim communities to send their sons and daughters to the school, although in fact, in terms of teaching, Islam is still rigid. and literal. In the end, this study shows the extent to which

the transformation of Salafi madrasas has implications for multiculturalism in Indonesia. To explain the transformation of Salafist madrasas and its implications for multiculturalism in Indonesia, the authors collect data through literature studies, interviews, and observations. For the literature study, the researcher reads and maps the results of the analysis sourced from scientific journals, books, research reports, and internet sources whose topic of study is related to this research. Then, the researcher also conducted in-depth interviews with a number of Salafi activists. Researchers also conducted field observations to describe the activities of Salafi madrasas.

In this case, multiculturalism is as a theory or approach to the object of research. Researchers use it to dissect the Salafi madrasas curriculum through two serious questions, whether the curriculum used by Salafi madrasas has met the principles of multicultural education, and whether it has also been integrated with the national education system, or vice versa. Through Bikhu Parekh's thesis which states that the principle of multicultural education is not only to include religious, cultural, reading, and different belief systems, but that an educational institution or educator must educate its students to be open-minded (not exclusive and narrow-minded) and able to have a positive dialogue with diverse cultures (Parekh, 2002). With this theory, this article will describe whether Salafis are transforming their da'wah movement through their internal education system or just willing to eliminate public perception that they are extremist and terrorist groups.

The Emergence of Salafi in Indonesia

Salafi is defined as a literalist Sunni Islam group who studies classical Islamic books, with the aim of restoring the life of Muslims as in the era of *salaf al-saleh* (Olidort, 2015). However, due to differences in da'wah strategies and perspectives on certain religious issues, the existence of Salafis cannot be understood singly. Western scholars often claim them, or refer to the words "Salafi, Salafism, and Salaf," as closed, rigid and always instills jihadist, *anti-bid'ah*, and radical Islamic group. In reality, however, this is not always the case. Many Salafiyah/Salaf Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) or traditional Islamic madrasas in Indonesia taught moderate Islamic doctrine long before Salafism emerged in Indonesia. The various Islamic educational institutions, both managed by Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, did not teach verses of the Qur'an and other religious texts literally and harshly. Thus, their existence cannot be equated and associated with Salafis (Azra, 2018).

Salafis emerged in the mid-1980s. Its presence coincided with the growing activism of various other transnational Islamic movements in Indonesia. One of the factors of the emergence of Salafis was influenced by the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979). At that time, many books, publishing houses, and print medias based on radical Islam were established, with the segmentation of readers from young Muslims. Various books published in those years were oriented towards the victory of Iran's Islam, while at the same time, Salafi activists were studying classical Arabic books by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (*Ushulu al-Thalathah*, *Sharah Kitab al-Tawhid*, dan *Kasyfu al-Subhat*), Ibn Taimiyah (*al-Aqidah al-Wasithiyah*), and Abdul Halim Uwais (*Musykilah al-Syabab fi Dzau al-Islam*).

During the pre-New Order era, they studied these books from one *halaqah* to another using a learning approach centered on a *murabbi*. They work in a monotonous manner; go to the mosque, then return to the cottage, boarding house, or rented house, where all of these were inhabited by Salafi activists. The limitations of these activities and space could not be separated from the influence of the government that limited every Islamic activity at that time. On the other hand, the situation is also exacerbated by the scorn that comes from the surrounding community. The situation remains unchanged after the Reformation (1998). Salafi activities are still limited to living in mosques or prayer rooms in villages, but they are no longer worried about their existence being known by the public, so there is no need to carry out *halaqah* in secret (Suhendra: Interviewed on 2013).

Ideological and Jihadists Salafis

In its development, Salafis have experienced fragmentation into two movements; Ideological Salafis and Salafi Jihadists (Muthohirin, 2017). Young Muslims who are members of the Ideological Salafi are referred to as "apolitical silence" groups since they choose to exclude themselves from the public and create *enclaves* with their own community, are bearded (*lihyah*), wear robes (*jalabiyyah*), wear a turban (*imamah*), and wear pants only above the ankles (*isbal*) (Hasan, 2008). In addition, their Islamic views are closed, not contextual in interpreting the verses of the Qur'an and Hadith, and limiting themselves from political activities and other national issues (Suhendra: Interviewed on 2013).

The ideological Salafis believe that an Islamic state will only be formed when Muslims consciously apply Islamic teachings in their daily lives. If Allah's commandments are carried out in their entirety, the realization of an Islamic state will be realized by itself. However, without fulfilling the obligations ordered by religion, that hope will only become wishful thinking. The desire of the Salafis to restore the lives of Muslims as they were during the *Salaf al-Shaleh* period is based on several conditions, such as moral degradation, deviations from *Tauhid* (monotheism), and the mixing of *bid'ah* into worship practices. They claim that Islamic reform will never happen if it doesn't start by reforming the rituals of worship in every Muslim's personality (Griffel, 2015). One of the concrete examples of worship ritual reforming is to cleanse Tawhid from *bid'ah* (Hasan, 2010a). This ideological Salafi refers to the movement that emerged in Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab in 1745 (Algar, 2011; James Oliver, 2002; Ubaidillah, 2012).

In the past two decades, Salafis have transformed their movement by responding to global humanitarian issues, such as social justice, economic development, Islamic politics, and the caliphate, and trying not to get stuck only on the issue of Islamic purification. Ideological Salafis establish themselves as Salafi Jihadists. However, the emergence of the ideology of salafism actually gave birth to world chaos. Salafi Jihadists are described as terrorism, anarchism, and actions against governments with a nation-state system. This fact is as contained, for example, in a research report by the United States (US) Department of Defense published by the RAND Corporation, "*A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al-Qaidah and Other Salafi Jihadists*" in 2014. It was stated that a number of Salafi Jihadist groups had existed and carried out acts of terror since 1988. From 2010 to 2013, the number of Salafi Jihadist groups sympathetic to al-Qaeda increased from 31 to 49 groups. Meanwhile, the number of jihadist fighters has more than doubled to 100,000 jihadists. Then, the number of attacks affiliated to al-Qaeda tripled to around 1,000 attacks from the previous 392 attacks (Jones, 2014).

As a result of radicalization of thought and the desire to be involved in the global political and economic arena, the Salafi movement which originally resided in solitude and avoided the hustle and bustle of global politics, suddenly turned into an unstoppable political, military and organizational force. In Pakistan, for example, Salafi Jihadists are manifest in the terrorist organizations Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Jamaat-ur-Ahrar. Regarding the case of Pakistan, the thing that needs to be of

common concern is that this country is an "inappropriate model" of the phenomenon of the proliferation of reproduction of Ideological Salafi groups into Salafi Jihadists. As a result, Anatol Lieven "judged" Pakistan as a country full of violence, injustice, oppressive actions against women and children, corruption, and a home for extremism and terrorism groups (Lieven, 2011).

Ideological Salafi activism allows it to reproduce into an extremist movement in any country, whether it is war or in a state of harmony with diversity (multicultural), as has happened in Indonesia (Ali, Afwadzi, Abdullah, & Mukmin, 2021). This trend is evident from a number of acts of terrorism in several areas in the last five years. These acts of terrorism were carried out by very young terrorists who were recruited through Islamic assemblies organized by Salafi groups. These Islamic assemblies teach young Muslims about radical religious understanding, by considering the system and state apparatus protected by democratic governments as images or idols (*thaguth*) (Suhardianto: Interviewed on 2021).

Although it cannot be fully considered that the Ideological Salafis teach the doctrine of violence, the attitude of alienating oneself from the association of the general public, closing oneself off from contemporary thinking, and being rigid, literal, and textual towards the verses of the Qur'an and al-Hadith has the potential to become embryos for the growth of the seeds of Islamic radicalism. Radicalization of thought can appear in every individual of Salafi, especially if the ideas of the Islamic struggle are taught in the name of obedience to religion, and reject various new ideas of the nation-state; democracy, human rights, nationalism, and other modern thoughts (Redjosari, 2009).

The increasing number of fighters and attacks carried out by the Salafi Jihadist movement cannot be separated from the efforts to indoctrinate literal religious understanding given to young people through various means. The process of radicalization occurs when the interpretation of religion is interpreted as a single truth. In this case, Salafi Jihadists interpret Islam not only as relying on rituals of worship, but also as a means of political movement, a bridge to seize power, and a justification for violence. In addition, usually, Muhammad's profile as a military leader and stories of wars that occurred during the time of Muhammad and his companions also became justification for realizing war. John L. Esposito said that the perspective of the Salafi Jihadist group that identifies Islam with violence is none other than the absence of a single doctrine about the meaning of jihad (Esposito, 2015).

Salafi Madrasas Transformation

The strategy of radicalization, recruitment, and dissemination of Islamic salafism ideas has undergone a transformation in the last two decades. Salafis use social media as a new propaganda tool that connects the solidity and militancy of Islamic radical groups across countries. If we pay close attention, there are various Islamic topics that have become the material for propaganda for the ideas of Salafism, including the establishment of an Islamic state, purification of the belief and ideology of jihadism, as well as topics that raise contemporary humanitarian problems such as issues of social injustice, poverty, and brotherhood among Muslim countries (Suhardianto: Interviewed on 2021).

The repeated acts of terrorism and the massive dissemination of jihadist ideas have cornered Salafis. All the attributes that characterize them are viewed negatively by society. For example, they are bearded (*lihyah*), wearing a robe (*jalabiyyah*), wearing a turban (*imamah*), and wearing pants only above the ankles (*isbal*) for male activists (*ikhwan*), and using a face covering (*niqab*), covering the arms and hands, as well as wearing a dark colored and large headscarf for female congregation (*akhwat*). They view Salafis as a community that teaches the doctrine of violent extremism, regardless of the existence and different roles between the ideological Salafis who stay away from violence and theoreticalism, and still choose to "Islamicize" grassroots society through Islamic education, while the Salafi Jihadists act otherwise. For Ideological Salafis, a religious state can only be achieved if Muslims as a whole practice pure *Tauhid* (monotheism). This can all be achieved by consistently carrying out Islamic education and purification.

Therefore, Ideological Salafis try to eliminate public opinion which considers them to be part of terrorist groups and radical Islam through the transformation of their *da'wah* movement. The Salafi transformation is carried out in two mainstream movements, namely: First, the transformation of Salafi Islamic educational institutions, by integrating the curriculum of the Imam Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University in Saudi Arabia and the national education curriculum; Second, dissemination of the *hijrah* narrative to young Muslims in Indonesia, both online and offline (Akmaliyah, 2020; Hew, 2018; Muthohirin, 2021). This research is only limited to the transformation of Salafis in the field of Islamic education after the increasing suspicion of it as a group that disseminates the ideas of Wahhabism and is affiliated with terrorism globally.

Since the late 1980s, Salafi madrasas in Indonesia have been popular for developing rigid, literal, and exclusive Islamic learning contents. Various religious materials are taught with orientation to strengthening faith, morals, and pure monotheism in students. The Islamic boarding schools or madrasas they manage are anti science-based-knowledge and science of Sufism (tasawuf). Natana J. DeLong-Bas stated that Salafi madrasas teach the ideas of Wahhabism with rigid doctrines of monotheism, Islamic purification, anti-bid'ah, anti-Sufism, Arab dress, and closed religious practices (DeLong-Bas, 2004). Noorhaidi Hasan also concluded that the design of the Salafi madrasas curriculum emphasizes three important things, namely Tawhid, al-Wala wa al-Bara, and Islamic purification (Hasan, 2010b).

The teaching of Tauhid is the main orientation in the implementation of Salafi-style Islamic education. They believe that tauhid is the pillar of religion for all Muslims. By believing in the oneness of God, it means that Muslims must obey all orders and stay away from what He forbids. Pure monotheism means that it is not mixed with heretical practices as has been a tradition in the social and religious life of the Muslim community in Indonesia.

The Tawhid books taught in Salafi madrasas are classic works written by the following scholars (Hasan, 2010b); Al-Qaul Al Mufid fi Adillat al-Tawhid (a summary of the books of tauhid by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab), Al Qaul al-Shadid ala Kitab al-Tawhid (Abdurrahman al-Saudi), al-Usul al-Thalatha (M. bin Abdul Wahhab), al-Aqidah al Wasitiyyah (Taqiy al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah), and al Aqidah al-Wasitiyyah (salih ibn Fauzan Ali Fauzan). After completing these books, Salafi activists are recommended to master other tauhid books: Nabza fi al-Aqidah (Muhammad bin Salih al-Uthaimin), Sharh al-'aqidah al-Thahawiyyah al-Muyasssar (Muhammad ibn Abd Rahman al-Khamis), and Kitab al-Firqat al-Najiyat (Muhammad bin Jamil Zainu).

The various monotheistic books are taught in Arabic, not in Indonesian translation. Therefore, the first lesson in Salafi madrasas is the mastery of Arabic, both orally and in writing. The intensification of Islamic da'wah through teaching Arabic is a priority in the Salafi madrasa curriculum. It aims to give birth to a generation of Muslims (to become ustadz, mubalig, and Islamic thinkers) who are able to understand Islamic books written by classical ulama (Islamic theologian).

The Salafi madrasas curriculum which emphasizes the purification of tauhid, mastery of Arabic, and tahfidz al-Qur'an cannot be separated from its influence in adopting the curriculum of the Imam Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University, such as in the use of the Arabic language textbook, *Silsilatu Ta'limi al-Lughatal-'Arabiyyah* published by the university located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This book is widely taught in various Islamic educational institutions affiliated with Salafis. Students who study in this program are expected to be able to continue their studies at the Imam Ibnu Sa'ud Islamic University or at the Islamic and Arabic College of Indonesia (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab/ LIPIA) Jakarta.

Various Salafi madrasas which were originally expected to become centers of excellence for Wahhabism Islam, especially in Indonesia, have failed. Hasan suspected that the failure was the result of the exclusive, ancient, and Salafi conservative religious style. This Salafi madrasas model attracts only a few abangan Muslim children from rural families who come from the lower middle class economy (Hasan, 2010b). In addition, the increasing suspicion of Salafis after the terrorist acts that destroyed the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon on September 9, 2001, coupled with the emergence of acts of terrorism in many countries, as well as the fall in world oil prices which affected the Saudi Arabian economy exacerbates the failure of Salafist Islamic educational institutions in disseminating the ideas of Salafism in Indonesia.

These various backgrounds are the reasons for the Ideological Salafis to transform their da'wah movement. They rebranded the Islamic education system by integrating three curricula, including the national education curriculum, the Salafi madrasas curriculum (diniyyah), and the boarding school curriculum. The consequence of adopting the national education curriculum is that Salafi madrasas are no longer exclusive, rigid, and conservative. Curriculum integration makes Salafi madrasas a formal institution recognized by the state, so that the learning process in class must refer to the 2013 National Education Curriculum, which contains subjects such as religious education, citizenship education, Indonesian language, mathematics, science, social sciences, English, physical education, and craft.

Meanwhile, on another aspect, the Salafi madrasa maintains the old curriculum by providing students with mastery of Arabic, tahfidz al-Qur'an, as well as an understanding of faith (aqidah) and tauhid through various Islamic books by classical scholars. The various Islamic materials are given to students in a structured manner through boarding school curriculum

(diniyyah/boarding school), while general subject matter is taught in class through academic curriculum structure. However, in practice, every teacher is required to include an Islamic perspective—if not to say ayatization—in formulating Semester Learning Plans (RPS) and Main Learning Plans (RPP) for general subjects through the arguments of the Qur'an and al-Hadith, and Islamic stories (Ulvy, 2019). Various extracurricular skills are also provided, such as archery, horse riding, an intensive 30 juz tahfidz al-Qur'an program, as well as speeches in Arabic and English.

This transformation of Salafist madrasas requires modern and professional madrasa management with international standards. The identity of the school with the name SD Plus, SMP IT (Islam Terpadu), or SMA International Islamic Boarding School (IIBS) is a general description of modern Salafi madrasas. Some of the implications of the naming are that Salafi schools teach general subjects and diniyyah using Arabic and English (bilingual), have international cooperation, and even participate in various international competitions, from MTQ, tahfidz al-Qur'an, Arabic or English speeches, to various types of science olympiads abroad. At the local and national level, students at Salafi madrasas often win competitions held by the government such as the National Science Olympiad (OSN) and the National Student Sports Olympiad (O2SN).

Salafi madrasas get public attention because of their excellence in several fields, such as mastery of two languages (Arabic and English), tahfidz al-Qur'an, boarding school, and continuing to teach general sciences, coupled with having collaborations with a number of the best national and international universities. Therefore, salafi Islamic educational institutions have succeeded in targeting the upper middleclass people who live in urban areas. They entrust their children to Salafi madrasas even though they are very expensive.

In addition, citing Saparudin from the 2016 Ministry of Education and Culture data, by becoming a formal Islamic school recognized by the state, Salafi madrasas can access various financial assistance from the government, including School Operational Assistance (BOS) (Saparudin, 2017). In 2015, through BOS funds, two Salafi schools in Lombok, the Abu Hurairah and Assunnah schools received aid funds, amounting to Rp. 1,898,180,000 and Rp. 791,800.000, respectively (Kemendikbud, 2016; Saparudin, 2017). Meanwhile, teachers can apply for Teacher Certification allowances, and economically disanvataged students can apply for Poor Student Assistance (BSM).

Teachers at Salafi madrasas are graduates of various universities (Fadillah, Trisnamansyah, Insan, & Sauri, 2021). Before the transformation, the teachers in Salafi madrasas were only dominated by alumni from a number of Islamic universities in the Middle East and LIPIA. However, now it is more varied because the educators come from various leading universities in Indonesia such as Brawijaya University, UNAIR, UI, UIN and others. This is an absoluteness because Salafi madrasas need teachers who are able to teach a variety of general subjects.

Thus, as a state-recognized school, graduates from these Salafi Islamic educational institutions can continue their studies at public universities in the country, or also deepen their Islamic knowledge by studying at universities in the Middle East. The choice of access to a more diverse higher education was not obtained by students who graduated from Salafi madrasas in the past when they were exclusive, conservative, and anti-government.

Although it has been managed through modern and professional Islamic school management, the learning process for deepening Islamic content is still carried out exclusively. Aspects of national insight and nationalism strengthening for students are also still a big job for these Salafi Islamic schools. In fact, the national education curriculum ensures that every level of education accommodates the insights of Pancasila and Citizenship. This is because the national education system itself is formulated based on the state philosophy, namely Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Awwaliyah & Baharun, 2018; Junaid, 2012; Rubiyanto & dkk, 2003). This has also become the goal of national education as contained in Law Number 20 of 2003, which essentially facilitates students to become individuals who believe and fear God and become democratic and responsible citizens.

In addition, not all Salafi madrasas carry out managerial transformations and compromise to accommodate the national education curriculum. There are still many Salafi madrasas that maintain their old and exclusive character, and are only oriented towards pure tauhid and the ideas of Wahhabism. Therefore, quoting Hasan, the transformation of Islamic education in Salafi madrasas is actually just an image or branding. This transformation aims to divert public suspicion towards claims that Salafis are part of the global movement of terrorism and violent extremism (Hasan, 2010b).

Implications toward Multiculturalism

Wicktorowitz argues that what brings together Purified (ideological) Salafis and Salafi Jihadists is the basic idea of the Salafi movement that wants the purification of Islam and rejects the role of mind in religion (Wicktorowicz, 2006). Both of them also want life to return to the time of *salaf al-saleh*. Between the basic idea and the ideals of both movement are unity, (Muthohirin, 2014) but each realizes it in a different way. This is suspected to be a consequence of the response to the global (*and local*) political situation and the perception of some Muslim groups who consider Muslims to be experiencing social injustice for the progress of the Western world, so that the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in its various forms is absolute (Tibi, 2002).

There is nothing wrong with the basic idea of a Salafi who wants the purification of Islam. However, the practice of religious purification accompanied by acts of violence, neglect of other groups, and acts of terrorism are not Islamic teachings. Salafi Jihadists who practice violent extremism are in stark contrast to pure of tauhid it's self. Instead, to go to pure of tauhid, one must return to an understanding of the Qur'an and al-Hadith in a progressive, inclusive, and contextual way with the humanitarian problems that are being faced together.

In the context of a multicultural nation and state, all groups - regardless of their religious, ethnic, or group background - must be respected, valued, and protected.

In an effort to realize respect for multiculturalism, Ahmad Syafi'I Ma'arif encourages the integrity of brotherhood among all human beings regardless of religious background, belief, and other differences. Therefore, each of us needs to dispel thoughts that are filled with primordial fanaticism. Radicalism and all forms of extremism arise because there is no willingness on the part of some people to "critically assess the entire intellectual and cultural heritage of Islam through historical criticism, with the spirit of the al-Qur'an behind our minds" (Ma'arif, 1995; Saputra, Putra, & Putri, 2021; Sertkaya, 2022).

Moreover, Pancasila as a national identity formulated by the nation's founders aims to unite all different entities so that they are committed to mutual unity and integrity. In line with Parekh's explanation, that the national identity of a community (in this case is the state) must be defined strongly so that it includes all citizens by allowing one community to unite with another

(Parekh, 2002). Thus, referring to Parekh's statement, Salafis as one of the religious entities who also live in this country, are part of a community of a national identity that must be respected and protected. Although they do not recognize Pancasila as Indonesia's national identity in the aspect of doctrine and belief, it does not mean that their existence should be eliminated and antagonized. Together with civil society, the government is obliged to moderate religious understanding and strengthen their commitment to the nation and state.

By becoming a formal school under the supervision of the state, from a Salafi perspective, they want to show the public that Salafist Islamic education is not conservative and exclusive as is commonly discussed by society, especially if it is affiliated with terrorist networks. They want to show themselves as an organization that is not anti-government, accommodates aspects of citizenship, nationalism, and Pancasila. This is implemented through integration between the diniyyah curriculum and the national education curriculum in the madrasas they manage.

However, the authors encounter several problems related to the implementation of learning in Salafi schools which include: First, course subjects such as Pancasila and Citizenship are integrated with Social Sciences (IPS) lessons, which means narrowing the aspect of students' national insight; Second, the teaching of the books of faith and tauhid is still carried out in a literal, rigid, and exclusive manner, and is oriented towards the ideology of Wahhabism; Third, there is no national insight given to students, for example in the form of flag ceremony, putting up photos of the president and vice president, or introducing national heroes.

Salafi madrasas which become formal schools under state supervision are a new trend in Islamic education in contemporary Indonesia. Its presence gives a new color, as well as proof that whatever the ideological background of a group, it can live and grow in this multicultural country. However, the existence of Salafi madrasas, which are easily found in urban areas, deserves criticism in terms of its relation to the practice of multicultural education that is developing globally today. Even though they have rebranded their Islamic education curriculum, Salafi madrasas have not fully accommodated the principles of multicultural education as expressed by Bikhu Parekh.

According to him, the principle of multicultural education is not only to include religious lessons, culture, reading texts, and different belief systems, but that an educational institution or educator must invite students to think openly (not exclusive and narrow-minded) and enabling students to have a positive dialogue with diverse cultures (Parekh, 2002; Sahal, Musadad, & Akhyar, 2018).

Through the principles of multicultural education that Parekh has developed, Salafi madrasas still have a lot of homework to do. This is because, although the management aspect is managed in a modern and open manner, it is still monoculture (all teachers and students are from Muslims). In terms of curriculum structure, there is no material that accommodates local culture, moreover it is oriented towards intercultural dialogue, both in terms of subject matter and between actors in schools. In fact, dialogue between diverse cultures is the key to a common understanding to live in peace and avoid prejudice.

Conclusion

This research concluded that Wahhabi ideology campaign in Indonesia is not completely failed. The Ideological Salafi faction succeeded in disseminating the ideas of salafism/wahhabism through the transformation of Islamic education by gaining recognition from the state and becoming a formal school, as well as integrating the Islamic curriculum (*diniyyah*) which was developed based on the curriculum of the Imam Ibn Saud Islamic University with the National Education Curriculum. However, the transformation of the Salafi madrasas is still in the managerial aspect which aims to divert the suspicion of the public who considers Salafi as a terrorist and extremist organization as a whole. Meanwhile, in the aspect of teaching Islamic content, Salafi madrasas still emphasize the pure *Tauhid* (monotheism) doctrine that is oriented towards Wahhabism, a rigid and exclusive understanding of Islam.

On the other hand, although Salafi madrasas had promoted themselves as educational institutions that integrate *diniyyah* and national education curriculum, a number of lesson contents oriented to national insight was still very lacking. The content of Pancasila and Civic Education was only a supplement that combined as one subject, Sosial Science. This is coupled with the absence of flag ceremonies, playing of national anthems, posting of photographs of the president and vice president, introduction of national heroes, as well as Indonesian traditions and culture.

This model of transformation of Salafist madrasas has implications for the bleak future of Indonesian multiculturalism. Students do not have sufficient national insight and a strong spirit of nationalism – by not putting a Muslim's faith in a secondary position. Moreover, the principle of multicultural education strongly emphasizes the existence of dialogue between different communities/cultures, while in Salafist madrasas it looks very monocultural because the teachers and students all come from Muslim families with middle to upper economic backgrounds and live in urban areas. Urban people who are busy with work in public areas prefer to send their children to Islamic boarding schools because they apply two languages, have international standards, have a clean environment, and are different from the tendency of Islamic boarding schools in rural areas. So, although the school fees in these Salafi madrasas are very expensive, the enthusiasm of the urban Muslim community to send their children to these madrasas is very high.

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