Islam Movements, Democracy and Civil Society in Indonesia

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Abstract: The purpose of this study is detailed as follows describes the development of democracy and civil society in Indonesia to describe aspects of democracy and civil society to flourish in Indonesia to analyze the background of the rise of Islamic movements in Indonesia with regard to democracy and civil society. Often in the past, Islam was seen as external to Indonesia, especially Javanese culture. Then, radical and militant Muslims portrayed as a doll made by intelligence agencies of Indonesia while moderate Islam ‘civilian’ labeled as natural for Indonesia. Therefore, until now, most studies of Islam in Indonesia has been focused on this ‘moderate’. Currently, however, radical Islamic movements in Indonesia also sharply observed. Some of these movements use violence, some do not. This study did not talk about the dichotomy of radical movements or moderate public above but connects the concept of civil society, focusing on two Islamic movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS). This study reveals the thoughts and the basis used by both the students were active in the movement as well as the thoughts of the administrators of Justice and Welfare Party (PKS).

Key words: Islamic movement, democracy, civil society, Indonesia, concept

INTRODUCTION

Before talking this topic the researcher would like to start with a question where are we now? According to international discourse we are in the globalization era. There are many definitions about globalization but the essence of it is related to the economic capitalism. Anything will have meaning in society life if they can be felt directly and concrete as welfare, justice, the same rights, scientific development, democracy, freedom and so on. They are the labels used to signed this era. For the nation as Indonesia, that has not been ready to respond to it. The impact is the appearance of anything new that is never predicted before, including the problems dealing with socio-cultural and new religion interpretations.

Globalization deals with many life aspects and we cannot stop it nor can we avoid it. We are now becoming part of the globalization itself. If the globalization impacts occur to the social, culture and politics aspects that drive to the social change it is quite common but if it causes the appearance and development of new Islamic mainstreams as the way they proposed, it will be considered as problems that should be studied seriously. This situation has attracted numerous attention to discuss it academically especially on possible social conflict caused by the growing of some Islamic mainstreams such as al-Qiyadah, al-Qur’an Suci, Hizb dibalik Hizb, Lia Eden, Inkarus sunnah, Ika Bugis, Ahmadiyah and so on.

There are new mainstreams of Islam revitalization movements now in Indonesia aims to respond the globalization and modern life. In case of Indonesian muslim, religious movement aims are not only to correct internal Islamic interpretations but also to the external that is government policy related to religion. It is considered that the position of state authority in handling religion affairs is too much. From this many Islamic movements the majority of them occur among muslim students and Muslim society in Indonesia.

Research objectives: This research was conducted in order to see the development of organizations and Islamic movements in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is detailed as follows: describe the development of democracy and civil society in Indonesia; describe aspects of democracy and civil society to develop in Indonesia; to analyze the background of the rise of Islamic movements in Indonesia with regard to democracy and civil society.

Literature review
Indonesian Muslim students action union and justice and welfare party: Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) and the Justice Party (recognized as the Justice and Welfare Party in April 2003), in brief PKS, both founded in 1998 have their origin in the da’wah (propagation) movement on campus. The da’wah campus originated in the early 1970s at the Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology but did not spread substantially until the crackdown on the political students movement that resisted Suharto’s re-election in 1978.
This time Islamism provided the alternative activity to political movement. Without a doubt, their religious cause was first encouraged by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and later, by intensifying propaganda from the Middle East and especially from Saudi Arabia, seeking to counter the Shi'ah influence. Indonesia thus became involved both in global Islamic surge and in contests between various international Islamic groups (Miichi, 2003).

The students movement criticize in 1998 in many campuses in Indonesia sponsored by Amin Rais and finally becoming national power to insist Suharto leaves his position as a president. This movement rises new era, reformation. From this, since 1998s after New Order the discourse of civil society become a very popular in Indonesia. Civil society has become once more an attractive field of study among political theorists. Even civil society is often in opposition to state power and political society, the key role of the state in putting into effect what has been achieved in civil society and in protecting basic rights and liberties of individual members cannot be ignored. Without the power of state, civil society has the potential to degenerate into a sphere of civil warfare over ethnic, religious and class-based issues. It is important to stress that civil society cannot be a substitute for government. While untamed state power stands in the way of a democratic society, limited state power is sine quanon for a democratic order.

Civil society in theory: Today, the term civil society still continues to embody anti-state connotations. There is a tendency, especially in Turkey, to confuse non-governmental aspects of the concept with anti-statism. During the anti-communist opposition in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, civil society as a slogan emphasized its autonomy from the state. The revival of the concept in such a context formulated civil society and state as mutually exclusive phenomena. Cohen (1995) in their groundbreaking work Civil Society and Political Theory propose a three-part model which differentiates between civil society, the state and the economy. In their formulation, civil society is defined as the sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication (Fig. 1 and 2).

On the other hand, in this tripartite model the share of civil society does not comprise all social life outside of the state and the economy. Cohen also distinguishes political and economic societies from civil society in the sense that political society encapsulates political parties, parliaments and political organizations and mediates between the state and civil society and economic society is composed of the organizations of production, distribution, firms, cooperatives and institutions of bargaining such as unions and councils and has the mediating role between civil society and the economy. What distinguishes the actors of political and economic societies is that they are after state power and economic production respectively. On the other hand, the political role of the actors in civil society is limited to the politics of identity, influence, inclusion and reform.
The movement flourishing in civil society bring the discussion of new issues into the public sphere. They work for the expansion of rights, for the defense of the autonomy of civil society and for its further democratization. And they cannot try to replace the institutions of representative democracy. As Kadioglu (2005) argues, “Civility may be learned in the school of society but the lesson soon may be forgotten without an enforcing authority”. Following the three-part model of Cohen (1995), Habermas (1996) points to the limited scope of action of civil society: civil society can directly transform itself and it can have at most an indirect effect on the self-transformation of the political system; generally, it has an influence only on the personnel and programming of this system. But in no way does it occupy the position of a macro subject supposed to bring society as a whole under control and simultaneously act for it.

In this structure, the connection of civil society to political society is essential. While civil society must be eager to inform and influence political society, the latter must be open to the influence of the former. In other words as much as civil society should respect the decision-making power of political society, the latter should do so by being open to the information and feedback that it gets from the former. It is under this mutual relationship that civil society fulfills its role in the process of modernization.

According to Gellner (1994) among the major world civilizations and religions Islam is unique in terms of its immunity to secularization. Moreover, he claims that Islam “exemplifies as a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing institutions or associations which is atomized without much individualism and which operates effectively without intellectual pluralism.

Political Islam (Islamism), in various forms, is the most rapidly growing and persuasive ideology among Muslims today. Islamism is a socio-political ideology which strives to institute governments under Allah’s authority, not man-made constitutions and administration of society according to sharia (Islamic law), not Western law. The ideology of Islamism is the cutting edge of Islamic militancy’s exertions against the West and its global system. As an ideology, Islamism is distinct from the religion of Islam, although, it draws strength from zealous members of the Islamic resurgence. The Islamic resurgence does not protest against Islamic institutions but rather, protests against secular government and social innovations modeled on the West. Understanding the Islamists’ critique of modern life provides some clarity to these distinctions. Most Islamists (except for retrograde Salafists) are not against modern instrumentalities produced by industries (telephones, cars, airplanes, computers, etc.). Rather, Islamists are opposed to modernism, a sequel to industrialization and modernization which is the ideology of social innovation in a secular environment completely unhinged from traditional and religious norms.

The Islamists’ slogan, “Islam is the solution” (popularized by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb) will continue to inspire political exertions against Western-type governments in Islamic countries, until or unless the West convinces the Islamic world that it can have an equitable stake in globalization. Islamists will resist cultural and political influences of the West’s system, even if they acquiesce to economic interaction and trade. Their resistance to the West is not to imply mainly overt clashes. Most clashes for the proximate future will occur within the Islamic world itself, just as industrial countries of the West’s global system will have their own internal (especially social) problems.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Research approach: This study used a qualitative approach. Creswell (2013) qualitative research begins with the assumption, the lens interpretations/theory and the study of the problems faced by individuals or groups regarding social or humanitarian issues. In a qualitative approach, an important activity is the collection of data. In the field data collection researchers use to interview, observation and documentation.

Types of research: This research is a case study. Known case study because the focus of this study examines the uniqueness and the special phenomena that are only found on certain objects are not present on another object which occurred in HT activists among Muslim students was a supporter of the party PKS. Second, in general, PKS followers among the youth is a student who is actively involved in HT. From the data which is based on in-depth interviews were analyzed using a model of Bogdan and Miles, then the conclusions drawn.

Collecting data: This research using data collection methods include: interviews, observations and documentation. First, interview: interview is a method of collecting data by giving questions and answers done by two or more persons in which some of questions are offered regularly to attain the objectivity (Creswell, 2012). For this research, the researcher gives the questions to the activists of movements and party officials. Second, observation: observation means systematic observation and recording of phenomena are investigated (Creswell,
2009). Thus, the researcher comes and observes to record the activities. Third, Documentation. This method means the researcher collects the data from the document resources. The researcher collects some of the documents that are available in the organization.

**Data analysis:** After all the data is collected and analyzed using qualitative descriptive method. Data that is emic, after doing data reduction and construed in accordance with the statements delivered by the informant without changing the existing meaning. After the verification of the data and the conclusions drawn at the final stage.

**Research sites:** This study was conducted in five university campuses in the city of Malang. The targeted research is students who active at KAMMI and HT, whereas to obtain data such as the form of the narrative and views on Islamic ideology as the basis of the Justice and Welfare Party is done at the central office, the Justice and Welfare Party Malang.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

In this following studies, researcher looked at how these delicate relationship developed in Indonesia by seeing some Islamic movements. Many Islamic mainstreams and movements but he only want to take two Islamic movements, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Justice and Welfare Party (PKS). HT is an elitist movement that operates as a self-declared political Party grounded in radical Islamist ideology while using theology to justify its position. According to Abdullah Robin, a London-based HT leader, HT is “ the only political party wanting to unite the “ummah” as opposed to merely unifying the Muslims of a single nation-state, a political unit that HT believes to be anathema to Islam. HT therefore faces the challenge of unifying the multitude of diverse Muslim groups, each following different interpretations of Islam with the appeal of its own ideology. Being a pragmatic political movement, HT is prepared to accommodate other interpretations of Islam to reach its goal.

HT correctly identifies itself as truly modern Islamic movement. Although HT’s philosophy is not compatible with Western notions of modernity, unlike Wahhabism it pursues its objective through modern methods. HT’s propaganda machine reaches its prospective constituency through the party’s print media circulations, the Internet and personal recruitment. There are at least seven websites that are related directly to Hizb ut-Tahrir. One of these websites is devoted exclusively to interaction with the mass media. Ultimately, the challenge facing HT is creating a new world order. HT has provided Muslims with a compelling, satisfying explanation of why the Islamic world fell behind the West. In HT’s view, the only way to close the gap is to destroy the existing order. HT thus viciously opposes the current American-led international system and fundamentally disagrees with Francis Fukuyama who claimed that, due to the defeat of Nazi and communist threats to democracy and capitalism, the “End of History” had arrived. The spokesman of HT, Imran Wahid, recently stated that “we have reached the end of history because there’s a lack of a viable alternative ideology to capitalism and western civilization. We view our work as a direct challenge to that statement “we have to prove him wrong”.

HT believes that democracy eventually will be replaced by an Islamic order. In HT’s view, the US is waging a war on Islamic precisely because it fears its ultimate eclipse by a united Islamic world. To promote this view and to gain support, HT uses a mixture of communist methodology, Wahhabi theology and fascist rhetoric. Unlike other radical Islamist movements, who fight against the military in Muslim states, HT brings these forces to its side by infiltrating the security service with a radical political interpretation of Islam. HT also operates in several other pivotal countries and almost every head of a Muslim state considers the movement to be a serious national security threat. As the International Crisis Group has noted, HT was introduced in Indonesia in 1983 by Abdur-Rahman al-Bagdadi, of Jordanian-Lebanese descent. Its led by Ismail Yusanto, who became a member in 1985 while he was a geology student at the one of Indonesia’s leading institutions, the Gajah Mada University Yogyakarta. What started as an underground campus movement today remains largely campus based and enjoys well-attended rallies and meetings without government restrictions. This is despite the fact that it may have ties to violent extremist groups such as Jamaah Islamiyah, the group responsible for the Bali Bombing in October 2002.

With its rich and tolerant Islamic traditions, Indonesia is the best region to begin the battle for ideas in this existential struggle. It is also the primary target for HT. In waging ideological war, the US needs to highlight the importance of internal reform in the context of national security. Indonesia government cannot win the fight against radicalism unless there is a change in the political and economic conditions that have created a ripe environment for the acceptance of radical ideas. Democratic and economic reforms are therefore essential for long-term stability, since people with no opportunity to participate in civic life or to practice their religion openly and freely will go underground. Ultimately as
Abdiharakhitov in Eickelman notes, “if 50 years from today we win today we win this battle, it will be mainly thanks to good governance taking place in the Muslim world”.

In battle against HT in Asia including Indonesia, the West should focus primarily on improving socio-economic conditions, so that people can see the benefits of democratic capitalism and become less to oppose it. It is the economic realm that Western political and intellectual capital is best spent. Since, HT rejects the democratic process, Western efforts to engage the organization are pointless. By so intently focusing on democracy, the West is wasting valuable political capital and losing credibility with Asian governments without addressing HT’s fundamental arguments. The group has no desire to become part of something that it opposes and plans eventually to destroy. Second, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) tends to be regarded a more moderate and democratic than other parties in the political domain simply because their demonstration through radical criticizing the American position towards Muslims are always carried out very peacefully. Above, all, however, the justice party propagates an Islamist political ideology that attempts to re-establish Islamic civilization and to place Islam at the centre of the political order. The manifesto of the Justice and Welfare Party says, “Allah who has supreme power wished human beings to play a role as representatives of God or the Caliph”. It depends on how far human beings are responsible to function (as caliph) consistently. The universal value of democracy is people’s interpretation of the responsibility (caliph). Such an understanding of democracy is not far removed from that of so-called “militants” or “fundamentalists”, who may deem the justice Party to be “radical” enough in terms of political thought but too moderate in its methods. Not only, therefore, should we carefully examine the interaction between thought and actions of specific moderate groups, we also need to draw the complete map of social and political movements in order to understand so-called militants. After the data obtained through interviews and observations, it can be described as follows: After the new order government era collapsed and was replaced by a new era, reform, then there was a new awakening, a new spirit associated with things that were once banned by the government restrictions and new orders. New discourse related to modern thinking, fundamental thought, political and social life is growing so fast. New movements emerged among students and certain groups in the form of fundamentalist groups or in the form of new Islamic parties. Sights such as these show that the civil society as one embodiment of democracy in Indonesia began to grow.

With the phenomenon mentioned above, it can be seen that during the reign of new orders era, the power to use military force and the single has been replaced by the era of freedom, during which the political parties are limited, form of thinking should be uniform, not to be against the government’s program, although the program is not suitable for the life of Indonesian society in general. The party that there is, at that time the government has hegemony by force. In life there is almost no democracy, let alone the growing civil society. When a students asked about the differences in social conditions in the future new orders era compared with the era of reform, they replied that at present there is academic freedom and the freedom to express academic activities both on campus and outside campus. So also from the PKS party officials, they feel no pressure whatsoever that they were afraid to take charge of the party because there is no longer a spy from the authorities as it had done during the government of new orders era, especially to government employees. However, the era of reform and freedom not only give birth to positive things but also the birth of new streams in the religion of unknown origin and the inclusion of Islamic movements coming from abroad like, Ikhwânul Muslimîn (IM), Hizb ut-Tahrîr (HT), Jama‘at Tablîgh (JT) and so forth. All these movements dragging Indonesian students and young people who thirst to the phenomenon and the new movement. Through these Islamic movements, they can voice ideology and new expectations, especially for Muslims in Indonesia. Islamic movements can beat the organizations intra and extracampus. According to the students, this condition is a form of democracy and freedom of activity among students and has implications for public life in general.

Why did the students look at Islamic movements as forms of democracy and civil society? According to them democracy and civil society will not be born if it is not driven by Islamic movements and Islamic parties. Monarchy is contrary to Islam. Islam teaches freedom of choice, plan a new life, tolerance, equality and a normal life as a human being without any pressure from anyone. That was the birth of the Islamic movements should be supported as well as the birth of parties based on Islam must be accommodated because all these are efforts to establish a democratic life and civilian life or civil society in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

After the reform movement spearheaded by the entire community is mainly done by the students, then Indonesia entered the era of reform and freedom in many aspects of life. Such conditions have spawned a wide
range of movements and parties in the community. Euphoria of democracy and freedom of this kind are very visible and be felt among the students. On campuses, students demanding their freedom of expression related to academic and religious life. With the birth of the democratic era, many new streams in Islam is growing continuously as a form of democratic expression. Besides appearing parties accommodate students and Muslim students in the city who have ideals and want to build a civil society. The students chose to enter Islam Islamic parties for the distribution of ideology and political activity. Justice and Welfare Party is the choice for the right one for them. This is the background why they joined the party.

**SUGGESTIONS**

It can not build the ideal state not to mention Islamic state if the two movements cannot empower and share the two important roles in the state that is civil society and state itself. They have to solve their Islamic internal problems that the concept of Islamic civil society in some aspects is different from the concept of civil society on West views. So the Islamic slogan “Islam is rahmatan lil alamin” for Muslims life is not a state of being but more as a state of becoming for the Islamic society because it needs to be materialized real in economics, culture, social and politics of Muslim life.

**REFERENCES**


