

# **SOCIAL INTEGRATION AS A PREVENTATIVE STRATEGY TO COMBAT RISING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM/TERRORISM IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE**

*Disusun dan Diajukan untuk Memenuhi Salah Satu Syarat Memperoleh Gelar Sarjana Sosial  
(S.sos.) Strata-1*

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**UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH MALANG**

**2024**

**SOCIAL INTEGRATION AS A PREVENTATIVE STRATEGY TO  
COMBAT RISING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM/TERRORISM IN  
NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE**

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
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15/04/2023	MENERIMA TANDA ACC	
17/04/2023	TAMBA REFERENSI, TEORI	
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## ABSTRAK

**Pakiso Isaac Monyako, 2024, 201910360311368, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Program Studi Hubungan Internasional, Social Integration As A Preventative Strategy To Combat Rising Islamic Extremism/Terrorism In Northern Mozambique, Dosen Pembimbing: Muhammad Fadzryl Adzmy, MA.**

### Abstrak

*Artikel ini membahas krisis teroris di Cabo Delgado, Mozambik Utara. Artikel ini mengusulkan teori sosiologis Integrasi Sosial sebagai alat yang mungkin digunakan dalam membendung penyebaran dan membunuhnya krisis teroris Jihadis. Artikel ini berupaya menjawab pertanyaan tersebut; seberapa besar kemungkinan integrasi sosial dan kebijakan berbasis integrasi sosial dapat menyelesaikan fragmentasi sosial yang menyebabkan ekstremisme atau terorisme di Cabo Delgado? Artikel ini melakukan ini dengan pertama-tama berusaha untuk membuktikan bahwa adanya konflik sosial antara Muslim di utara dan pemerintah di Maputo adalah salah satu faktor yang mungkin menyebabkan pemberontakan dan akhirnya kooptasi krisis oleh gerakan Jihadis. Selanjutnya artikel mengusulkan bahwa integrasi sosial dapat digunakan untuk meningkatkan hasil konflik. Artikel ini menggunakan kerangka integrasi sosial yang dikembangkan oleh Departemen Ekonomi dan Sosial PBB (UN DESA) untuk menguji hipotesis bahwa integrasi sosial dapat digunakan dalam konflik ini. Pada akhirnya, temuannya adalah bahwa integrasi sosial juga dapat berguna jika digunakan bersama dengan pendekatan berorientasi keamanan dari Angkatan Bersenjata Mozambik dan SAMIM.*

**Kata Kunci:** Social integration; terrorism prevention; insurgency, grievances; regional security

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## ABSTRACT

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### Abstract

*This article discusses the terrorist crisis in Cabo Delgado, Northern Mozambique. The article proposes the sociological theory of Social Integration as a possible tool to use in stemming the spread of the Jihadist terrorist crisis. The article seeks to answer the question; how likely are social integration and policies based on social integration to resolve the social fragmentation that has led to extremism or terrorism in Cabo Delgado? The article does this by first seeking to establish that social conflict between the Muslims in the north and the government in Maputo is one possible factor that led to the insurgency and the eventual co-opting of the crisis by the Jihadist movements. Next the article proposes that social integration can be used to improve the outcomes of the conflict. The article uses a Social integration framework developed by UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) to test the hypothesis that social integration can be used as a tool in this conflict. At the end, the findings are that social integration can be a useful tool if used in conjunction with the security-oriented approach of the Mozambican Armed forces and SAMIM.*

**Keywords:** Social integration; terrorism prevention; insurgency, grievances; regional security

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## KATA PENGANTAR

First and foremost, I want to thank God for his love, protection, and grace in the last 5 1/2 years. I want to thank God for his love for me, the grace he continues to bestow upon me, and lastly for the protection of myself and the people I love.

I want to thank my parents, the centre of my life, for their faith in God and prayers for me. I also thank them for their support and faith in my dreams. I will never take that for granted.

To my mother, **'Mapakiso Monyako**, who is the kindest, smartest, and most generous woman I know, thank you for your steadfast faith in God, your support of my dream of coming to Indonesia, and for believing in me, even when I didn't believe in myself. Thank you for teaching me the power of prayer and faith in God and the resilience to push through even when it seems nigh impossible. I love you.

To my father **Tsebo Monyako**, who is the most intelligent and honourable man I know, you taught me integrity by example and have sacrificed and dedicated yourself to your family without question for as long as I've had eyes to see. Thank you for your love and support. I hope to one day be half the man you are and only wish to make you proud. I love you.

To my three younger siblings, **Khotso, Katleho, and Mpho**. Thank you for your sacrifices and support collectively as a family. I love and pray for all of you and am forever proud to be your elder brother. To **Khotso**, thank you for taking care of everyone in my absence. To **Katleho**, thank you for inspiring me by fearlessly pursuing your dreams. And to my sister, **Mpho**, thank you for your love and prayers and for growing into a smart young lady – the world is your oyster.

To **Sainey A. Bojang** of Sukuta, The Gambia, you are the smartest and kindest man I've ever met. Thank you for your friendship and support. I hope your life was at least half as enriched as mine was for having known you the past 5 years at UMM. I will forever pray for you and your family and may God pour his blessings upon your life in abundance.

I dedicate this work to my two grandmothers, **'Makelello Monyako** and **'Mamotlalentoa Marabe** for being the two strongest women I've ever known, and for the unconditional love they showed me in their time on earth. I carry you in my heart always.

I also dedicate this work to the late **Lentša Monyako** and **'Mantai Mary Marabe**. I love and miss both of you and now your names will forever live in this work and not be forgotten.

To my friends at home and here in Indonesia. Thank you.



Kepada seluruh guru dan dosen yang telah mengajari saya, terima kasih telah memberikan ilmunya dan memperlakukan saya dengan adil dan hormat.

Kepada pembimbing skripsi saya, **Pak Muhammad Fadzryl Adzmy** dan para penguji skripsi saya, terima kasih banyak.

Kepada tim di kantor ProdiHI terima kasih sudah berusaha sekuat tenaga membantu saya sampai disini. Saya tidak akan pernah melupakannya.

Kepada tim di IRO, **Pak Very**, **Pak Dimas** dan lainnya, terima kasih atas dukungan dan bimbingannya serta telah menjadi support system utama saya di Indonesia. Tuhan memberkati kalian semua.

Malang, 27 Januari 2024



Pakiso Isaac Monyako



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## **SOCIAL INTEGRATION AS A PREVENTATIVE STRATEGY TO COMBAT RISING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM/TERRORISM IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE**

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### **Abstract**

*This article discusses the terrorist crisis in Cabo Delgado, Northern Mozambique. The article proposes the sociological theory of Social Integration as a possible tool to use in stemming the spread of the Jihadist terrorist crisis. The article seeks to answer a question; how likely are social integration and policies based on social integration to resolve the social fragmentation that has led to extremism or terrorism in Cabo Delgado? The article does this by first seeking to establish that social fragmentation between the Muslims in the north and the government in Maputo is one possible factor that led to the insurgency and the eventual co-opting of the crisis by the Jihadist movements. Next the article proposes that social integration can be used to improve the outcomes of the conflict. The article uses a Social integration framework developed by UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) to test the hypothesis that social integration can be used as a tool in this conflict. At the end, the findings are that social integration can be a useful tool if used in conjunction with the security-oriented approach of the Mozambican Armed forces and SAMIM.*

**Keywords:** *Social integration; terrorism prevention; insurgency, grievances;  
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## A. Background

Responses to the ongoing conflict in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique have been mainly a deterrence policy that seeks to meet and match the power of terrorists/insurgents as well as to completely eradicate the issue of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. This securitization approach is spearheaded by the Mozambican Defense Force along with partners SAMIM and Rwanda sending in troops to help fight the extremists, restore order, and return displaced people to their homes.<sup>1</sup> More than seven (7) years (March 2017- present) into the conflict, the situation is still as dire in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. As of April 2023, the total number of organized political violence events has risen to 1,626; the total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence is 4,664 and the total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: is approximately 2,000 with a reported more than 800,000 people displaced from their homes (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, 2023).

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<sup>1</sup> SAMIM's operations are aimed at supporting the Republic of Mozambique to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. This is done by neutralising terrorist threat and restoring security in order to create a secure environment; strengthening and maintaining peace and security, restoring law and order in affected areas of Cabo Delgado Province as well as providing humanitarian relief to populations affected by terrorist activities, including internally displaced persons.

In the week beginning on the 30th of May 2022, 20 people were kidnapped by the insurgents and used as porters in a raid of a provisions convoy. Two public health services vehicles were also raided and, in the aftermath, the Islamic State (IS) released pictures from the vehicle ambush which showed a group of at least 26 armed young men undertaking the ambush. In that same week, the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) deployed six armored vehicles to a village following reports that insurgents entered the villages and kidnapped women. Many other incidents and responses by the joint forces of SAMIM supported by Rwandan troops were reported as well thereby clearly illustrating that the situation in Mozambique is still as dire today, as it was at the beginning of a conflict between the Mozambican State Security forces and the Jihadist terrorist groups in Cabo Delgado (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2022)

The northern province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique has a very rich and important role in the history of the Republic of Mozambique (*República de Moçambique*). This region has played host to several pivotal events in Mozambican history, first and most notably, as the battlefield for Mozambique's war of liberation from Portuguese colonial occupation<sup>2</sup> and currently, as the war ground in the battle between the Mozambican Defense Force and the Islamist(jihadist) insurgency. (Bonate, 2009)has written about the involvement of both the region of northern Mozambique and its majority Muslim population's involvement with the two liberation movements FRELIMO and RENAMO as well as their importance and centrality in the history of Mozambican politics.

Between the dates of 24-28th March 2021, the insurgency launched a long-threatened attack on Palma Town and simultaneously launched another attack on the coast in Macomia Town(Lister, 2021). The main attack in Palma Town was on gas projects worth \$60 billion led by companies including French petroleum giant Total (Morier-Genoud, 2020). The northern province of Cabo Delgado hosts several businesses in the extraction industry which descended upon Mozambique after one of the biggest gas finds in a decade<sup>3</sup>. The aftermath of the March 2021 attacks on the northern town of Palma – a gateway to giant gas fields(Mozparks, 2021), put the Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi under pressure from regional allies to counter the militants, whom the U.S. now labels part of the Islamic State. As a result, a Mozambican special police unit in conjunction with a group of South African mercenaries tried but were unable to defeat the group at that time. The situation became so desperate in the Cabo Delgado region that member states of SADC (Southern African Development Community) – of which Mozambique is also a

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<sup>2</sup> The Portuguese Administrative outpost in Chai, Cabo Delgado was the site of the first attack by FRELIMO which started an all-out war for independence from Portugal in September 1964. See (Henriksen, 1982)

<sup>3</sup> Cabo Delgado is currently the site of the three largest liquid natural gas projects in Africa. These projects are led by giants of the extractive industry such as Total, ExxonMobil, and ENI(Rawoot, 2020). Apart from the extraction of LNG, gold and ruby deposits found in the region have led to projects in the extraction of these precious resources. See (360 Mozambique, 2021)

member, started considering some kind of joint intervention in Cabo Delgado (International Crisis Group, 2021).

According to a report by the International Crisis Group, the Militants responsible for these attacks are known to locals as al-Shabab (not to be confused with Al-Shabaab, the jihadist group in Somalia)(AFP, 2019). These militants, as they were referred to at the time, and who have as of 2017 assumed the name Al-Shabab, started their activism in the early 2000s. Their activism had an Islamist orientation. First, they wanted alcohol banned and opposed the enrollment of children in state schools as well as women's right to work. Their activism was also fueled by other social and economic factors such as their exclusion from development plans in the extractive industry amid the discovery of ruby depositories and natural gas in northern Mozambique(Fabricius, 2018). Their activism moved to armed revolt in October 2017.

By June 2021, the terrorist attacks coupled together with the resultant security force operations in Cabo Delgado, Northern Mozambique had claimed approximately 3000 lives whilst at the same time displacing hundreds of thousands more people. The Mozambican security forces have taken a deterrent approach to dealing with the insurgency with now the involvement of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) sending troops through SAMIM as well as Rwandan forces(SADC, 2021). The current insecurity in the region has led to the suspension of a massive gas project. The Islamic State has claimed ties to the insurrection.

The insurrection is motivated by grievances by the militants of Northern Mozambique against the state owing to poor delivery of services despite burgeoning extraction processes of minerals and hydrocarbon deposits in northern Mozambique. The grievances are multiple and varied with some predating the current insurgency. The grievances or variables that play an important role in the conflict between the Mozambican Defense forces, SAMIM, and Rwanda, include but are not limited to, resource curse (Alberdi & Barroso, 2021), tribalism, heroin trafficking by elites that benefits the elite<sup>4</sup>, the new extractive adventures by international companies, long-held feelings of neglect by the people of northern Mozambique towards the state, the state's radical secularist policies, islamophobia etc.

(World Bank, 2018) in their poverty assessment of Mozambique in 2018 found that several other socio-economic issues have made the province into one that is prone to conflict. Chief among these indicators is poverty and inequality between regions – with rural regions suffering neglect in comparison

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<sup>4</sup> See “*The Heroin Coast: A Political Economy along the Eastern African Seaboard*”, Enact Research Paper, June 2018.

to urban regions. Another exacerbating factor to the conflict is that Tanzanians and other foreign groups have joined the militants fueling the insurrection and introducing an international element as well.

In November 2020 both Mozambique and Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding within which, both countries were to join forces in combatting the extremism in Cabo Delgado as well as extradition of Tanzanian nationals who were linked to ISIL and contributing to the crisis in Cabo Delgado (Al Jazeera, 2020). The Mozambican security forces are ill-equipped and weak and are struggling to gain control over the situation.

## **B. Statement of the problem**

In the last six years, the Mozambican Defense Force (MDF) and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), have been fighting terrorism in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. The conflict has affected the local population and led to the displacement of over 80,000 people and other humanitarian issues. Six years later little to no progress has been made in defeating the rise of Islamic extremism/ terrorism in Cabo Delgado. This research aims to answer the question of; how likely are social integration and policies based on social integration to resolve the social fragmentation that has led to extremism or terrorism in Cabo Delgado?

This research is not an attempt to measure social integration but rather an argument for the inclusion of social integration policies in the fight to quell the Islamic extremism in Cabo Delgado. The research further goes on to advocate for the use of social integration policies in conjunction with the military deterrence approach currently being implemented by MDF and SAMIM. The reasoning behind this is simple. For an end to the conflict to be realized, the government in Maputo needs the support and involvement of the local people in Cabo Delgado. The best way to do this is through social integration policies and making sure that, the population in northern Mozambique is integrated into the wider Mozambican population.

A UN Political Discourse and Social Integration Framework formulated by UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (DESA / *United Nations*, n.d.) is used to propose a possible way forward with social integration and dialogue as a major part of the peace process in the fight against the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado.

## **C. Methodology**

This research is a bibliographical study and qualitative exploratory research that uses secondary data to test a hypothesis.



#### **D. Theory**

The hypothesis is that pre-existing and increasing social fragmentation in Mozambique (between Maputo and Cabo Delgado is to blame for the conflict/rise of Islamic extremism/ terrorism in Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique. Social integration and policies based on social integration are likely to quell the rising Islamic extremism/terrorism caused by social fragmentation and Cabo Delgado. To arrive at the writer's hypothesis of the variables and possible solutions for the conflict in Mozambique, there are a few concepts that must be understood; social conflict, social fragmentation, social integration, and lastly, social cohesion.

It helps to visualize the conflict in Mozambique in a diagrammatic manner as follows; Social conflict leads to social fragmentation, social fragmentation leads to rebellion, uprising, insurgency, terrorism, civil war, armed conflict, or violence. In the ensuing violence, there has to be intervention. Intervention is the process between war and peace (positive or negative). When social integration is introduced at the intervention stage, it may lead to social cohesion, and then the cycle restarts again based on a new conflict. In the case of Mozambique and as illustrated above, there appears to be a cyclic and symbiotic relationship between social conflict and social fragmentation where it is not always clear which one came first. Does the social conflict come first and lead to fragmentation or does the fragmentation occur first and then lead to social conflict? For purposes of this research, the order of occurrence is not important in the researcher's hypothesis. What is clear is that both these variables exist and play an important part.

In analyzing the situation in Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique, it quickly becomes apparent that there appears to be social fragmentation that exists between the two regions of northern Mozambique and southern Mozambique. Northern Mozambique, which is mainly populated by Muslims, is underdeveloped in comparison to the southern part, has historical importance to the history of the country, and is a repository of newly discovered resources. It is inhabited by Mozambicans who are discontent and feel disenfranchised by the actions of the central government in Maputo, southern Mozambique. For its role in the conflict, Maputo (central government) views the situation in Cabo Delgado as one of terrorism and as a matter of national security especially in light of the rising number of attacks, casualties, and the major displacement of the population of northern Mozambicans.

According to different views on the theory of conflict, conflict is inevitable – a necessary evil that is a result of interaction between interdependent groups in a competitive setting (Oberschall, 1978). According to (Deutsch, 1983) competition is the necessary give and take that occurs between two interdependent parties where the result is that the probability of goal attainment for one party decreases the probability of goal attainment for the other party.

Social conflict as described by Coser in (Oberschall, 1978) refers to the necessary struggle between interdependent parties over values, status, and scarce resources with the proviso that the aim of the competing groups in this case is not only to attain the desired outcome for themselves but also to eliminate, injure and neutralize their rivals. This is the social process theory. Social conflict is also a dance of give and take whenever a decision has to be made within a society because the process of politics creates winners and losers and when this tension is not resolved in a way that is satisfactory to all parties involved, resentments are born and social fragmentation may occur. This is the social structure theory(Hu, 2020; Schellenberg, 1996).

Social conflict is a process of strong opposition of social subjects, which is aimed at conflict resolution in their interests and goals. The main consideration in the analysis of social conflicts is their inevitability in social relations in society. The main components of a social conflict are the presence of two or more parties, antagonism of the parties, and the assessment of opposition by an external observer(Nagaytsev, 2010).

As a sociological theory, social fragmentation theory can be used to explain, explore, and analyze a wide range of social phenomena such as race relations, class relations, religious conflicts, riots, civil disorders, demonstrations, rebellions, and a variety of other social phenomena. In the case of the rising terrorism and Islamic extremism in northern Mozambique, the theory of social fragmentation theory will be used to examine the structural relationship between the central government in Maputo and the isolated northern Mozambicans.

Social fragmentation occurs in situations of abuse, conflict, and social breakdown, where relationships are broken down and disintegrate creating a need for crisis intervention. Social fragmentation is a state in which society has lost trust in the political processes and in the ability of the government with and through its institutions to make the necessary or right decisions for the good of the particular society(Jeong & Seol, 2022). This is a state of institutional and interpersonal breakdown.

(Jeong & Seol, 2022) describes a fragmented society as one where social fragmentation is so severe that social integration is impossible. It is the author's view that the state of fragmentation in Mozambique has not yet got to a point where integration is impossible. Social integration can be used in the north of Mozambique to interrupt the cycle of social conflict, social fragmentation, and violence in Mozambique which has been persistent since independence in 1975.

A fragmented society is one where there exists an atomization or de-linkage and systematic disequilibrium that leads to an identity crisis at the societal level, isolation, and social conflict. Atomization of population means fragmentation - the breaking down of the population into disparate groups. This can lead to fragmented groups coming together and taking to the streets to protest the elite class that benefits the most from their associations with the ruling class(Jeong & Seol, 2022).

(Ozdogan, 2008) concludes that fragmented societies are hotbeds or incubators for terrorism. He makes a connection between social fragmentation and the processes of colonialism that fragmented societies share in common. He also adds the world system and ethnic identity as drivers for terrorism. He believes that only two factors truly matter in assessing social fragmentation and its connection to terrorism and those are the colonial past of a state and a consciousness of ethnic identity.

(Yurchenko, 2017) research on Ukraine and the social fragmentation that led to the Maidan protests, and the eventual Declaration of Independence of the republics of Donetsk and Lugansk traces the social fragmentation back to the radical social transformation that happened in the 1990s when a regime of neoliberal kleptocracy was born. (Yurchenko, 2017) finds that Ukrainian society was atomized as a result of economic hardship and instability. You left the funds that a lack of trust in political forces also led to the fragmentation as well as monopolization of the country's political system by Kuchma and his cronies. She then links the social fragmentation to processes of corrupt oligarchs and adventures in the extractive industries and the energy market in Ukraine she concludes that it was the economic conditions. As well as the marginalization of native Russian speakers that led to the uprising of the miners.

(DEEMING, 2013) believes that inequalities in wealth and opportunities lead to social fragmentation. The economic divide between those who have and those who are poor creates a divide between those who are poorer and those who are rich. Wealth and opportunity gaps continue to widen. The result is social Fragmentation and the creation of different social worlds this fragmentation erodes social cohesion, social trust, and cooperation and eventually leads to the galvanization of the poorer class to effect an uprising against the ruling class.

Social integration's main goal goes beyond mere abstractions. Realizing social integration is important in Cabo Delgado because exclusion from political and economic participation leads to armed rebellion and undermines democracy. Furthermore, regions that are left behind in terms of economic progress and barriers in social mobility experience a degree of powerlessness that can lead to rioting by disaffected communities.

There is a high level of political salience in social integration(Atkinson et al., 2010). As social integration increases, social fragmentation decreases, and as a result, the Islamic extremism/terrorism conflict is likely to be mitigated. Social integration and social integration policies affect social fragmentation by reducing it.

Social integration can be a state or a process. However, social integration as envisaged in this work refers to a peace-building process that is aimed at achieving an end to the terrorism or insurgency problem in northern Mozambique. When applied properly, the researcher hypothesizes that social integration policies used in conjunction with the current deterrence operations can yield a longer-lasting

peace agreement and social cohesion as well as a break in the cycle of civil wars that have plagued Mozambique since its liberation from Portugal in 1975.

(Blau, 1960) describes social integration as a state that prevails within a social group if the bonds of attraction formed by members of that particular group are strong enough to unite the members of the group. (United Nations, 1995) in the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development refers to social integration as "... the process of fostering societies that are stable, safe and just and that are based on the promotion and protection of all human rights, as well as on non-discrimination, tolerance, respect for diversity, equality of opportunity, solidarity, security and participation of all people, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and persons." (Commitment 4 of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development).

Social integration is used in this work as a tool of conflict resolution/ mitigation tool and also as a process that can lead to social cohesion. Durkheim described social integration or social solidarity in reference to concepts of anomie, Egoism, lack of coordination and forced division of labor. To Durkheim all these states were abnormal. Durkheim pioneered the theory of social integration and described social integration as a desired condition where individual passions are regulated by shared culture and individuals are also attached to their society by rituals and reciprocal gestures, legitimate political structures regulate and coordinate actions and lastly, legitimate inequalities correspond to the distribution of talents.

He saw social integration as an antidote to anomie. In the same way, social integration is proposed in this work as a potential solution to a lasting resolution of the terrorism problem in Cabo Delgado. The Copenhagen Declaration on social Development, commitment 4. (b)<sup>5</sup>, (c),<sup>6</sup> (d),<sup>7</sup> (f),<sup>8</sup> (I),<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Formulate or strengthen policies and strategies geared to the elimination of discrimination in all its forms and the achievement of social integration based on equality and respect for human dignity;

<sup>6</sup> Promote access for all to education, information, technology and know-how as essential means for enhancing communication and participation in civil, political, economic, social and cultural life, and ensure respect for civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;

<sup>7</sup> Ensure the protection and full integration into the economy and society of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and persons;

<sup>8</sup> Recognize and respect the right of indigenous people to maintain and develop their identity, culture and interests, support their aspirations for social justice and provide an environment that enables them to participate in the social, economic and political life of their country;

<sup>9</sup> Recognize and respect cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, promote and protect the rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, and take measures to facilitate their full participation in all aspects of the political, economic, social, religious and cultural life of their societies and in the economic progress and social development of their countries.



Social integration concerns policies that can be made by the government in order to reduce factors such as economic inequality, poverty, deprivations, etc., that prevent the possibility of social cohesion thereby directly resulting in the alienation of minority groups or other affected groups in a society.

The starting point in this work is a presumption that there is social fragmentation in Mozambican society (Maputo and Cabo Delgado). The social erosion (decline in social cohesion) is owing to social fragmentation and the existence of social conflict and the result of this fragmentation is the violence that periodically springs up in Mozambique and that is currently playing out in Cabo Delgado. To that end, social integration can be used as a tool to identify the real social issues at the root of the problem.

Social cohesion refers to the glue and bonds that hold communities together. It is a state of trust and belief by a community that the society they share is a moral one and that they can trust each other in that community (Larsen, 2013). It is a non-tangible thing and exists in the cognition of the members of society. This means, that most political decisions made by the state through its institutions are indicators of social cohesion as far as they promote the cognitive glue and bonds that hold a particular society together. It follows then that all peace efforts or attempts to quell the insurgency or terrorism in Cabo Delgado are attempts at creating social cohesion in a place where there has been fragmentation and social erosion or decline of social cohesion.

The working definition of social integration by (UN-DESA/DSPD, 2005) sets out social integration as a process of mutual accommodation in social transformation that involves multiple stakeholders all working towards the creation of more peaceful and just social relations and institutions. Social integration as a theory has been applied to studies of immigrants and their assimilation into host communities as demonstrated by (Sohrabi & Farquharson, 2016). It has also been studied with an emphasis on economic development with an understanding that eradicating poverty and creating an economically inclusive society will promote sustainable and equitable development (Cruz-Saco, 2008). However, for this research, social integration will be studied from a purely qualitative point of view and by looking at the socio-economic and political variables with an understanding that policies that address these inequalities can promote social integration and in the case of Cabo Delgado, social integration as a result of those policies can be a tool that can lead to substantial improvements in the terrorism crisis.

## **E. Analysis**

### **1. Social fragmentation as the cause of conflict**

The northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado is home to a majority Makonde tribe and two main minority tribes the Makua and Mwani. When compared to the Maputo province which is where the central government is situated, Cabo Delgado is more than three times its size. It is also rich in natural

resources such as precious stones (rubies), natural gas, and graphite. On the other hand, the populations of both Cabo Delgado and Maputo provinces approximately are equal in number.

Cabo Delgado is a majority Muslim province with one of the oldest Sufi adherents leading back to Mozambique's history with Muslim traders from the Middle East and South Asia in the 7th century. Maputo on the other hand is a predominantly Christian province. There is an apparent and blatant inequality between Maputo and Cabo Delgado. In 2007, the illiteracy rate in Cabo Delgado was 66.6%. Whereas in Maputo the illiteracy rate was at 22%. The economic inequality was also recorded with Maputo having 3.6 times the GDP per capita of Cabo Delgado at 70,652 MT) and a mere 19,524.34 of Cabo Delgado. The socioeconomic disparities between the two provinces are evident in almost all aspects including healthcare with Cabo Delgado having higher death rates even for treatable diseases such as TB and malaria.

Long before the attacks of August 2017 that led to the current conflict between the MDF and its SAMIM partners against the Islamist rebels/ terrorist groups in Cabo Delgado, there were pre-existing low-level conflicts between RENAMO (former civil war movement) and FRELIMO the current Mozambican administration. RENAMO decried the fact that Cabo Delgado remained neglected and hadn't benefited from the economic boom of the 2000s. In 2017 the issue was Maputo's policy on resource extraction in Cabo Delgado which is known to be the most resource-rich region of the country.

RENAMO demanded a more equitable distribution of the proceeds from the extraction of natural resources to promote the socio-economic development of Cabo Delgado especially as many resources came from the province. Cabo Delgado is also a stronghold for RENAMO which is a former liberation movement with a history of civil war against the rivals in the South, FRELIMO. Only three years before the onset of the current conflict in 2014 RENAMO and FRELIMO had been involved in an elections dispute where FRELIMO had won elections in 2014 but RENAMO contested the results.

### **1.1 A region ripe for conflict**

The first example of structural violence that in turn promotes social is the local economy in northern Mozambique which rests in the hands of FRELIMO<sup>10</sup> officials. This has resulted in an economy that has been characterized by different forms of monopoly and illicit activity. The activities include

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<sup>10</sup> From the Portuguese *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, lit. 'Liberation Front of Mozambique'. Frelimo is the dominant party in Mozambique and was formed in 1962, as a nationalist movement fighting for the self-determination and independence of Mozambique from Portuguese colonial rule.

forestry, mining, and transport operations which were subsidized by the FRELIMO government in Maputo<sup>11</sup>.

Another factor that contributed to the inevitability of conflict in Cabo Delgado is the human security issues that followed as Cabo Delgado's coastline became a hotspot for import and transnational drug (heroin and other narcotics) trafficking by Mozambican cartels of South Asian descent under the protection of FRELIMO's government apparatuses both at a national and local (Cabo Delgado) level. The proceeds from these illicit enterprises were laundered by the elites who were the direct beneficiaries (FRELIMO's allies) through the political system thereby keeping Maputo (government) content with the status quo in the northern province (Haysom et al., 2018).

As has been stated earlier, Cabo Delgado played an important role in the liberation of Mozambique from Portuguese rule and later in the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO<sup>12</sup>. Poverty and other socio-economic factors as well as tribal tensions also played a significant role in aggravating local tensions as well as tensions between the population of northern Mozambique and the government in Maputo in the south. In addition, two factors in particular will be dealt with individually because of the author's opinion of the weight of the influence they have had on the conflict in northern Mozambique which has been described by a Mozambican senior government official in Cabo Delgado as a "...protest against socio-economic asymmetries and inequalities."<sup>13</sup>

## **1.2 The Religion vectors**

On the other hand, as stated already, Cabo Delgado is home to the largest Muslim population in Mozambique, which predates Christianity and the colonization by the Portuguese. Because of the strongly held beliefs and faith held by the majority Muslim people of the north, they have suffered periodic marginalization since the beginning of Mozambique's long history. During the colonization by Portugal, the Sufi Muslim population found in Cabo Delgado received multiple attempts at marginalization by the Portuguese administration because, in their minds, the Portuguese colonizers considered the resilience of the Muslim population of the north as a threat to their colonial rule (MACHAQUEIRO, 2012). The

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<sup>11</sup> See "President Filipe Nyusi's northern allies on the lookout for good deals", Africa Intelligence, 16 February 2017; and "The Quionga network", Africa Confidential, 12 April 2013.

<sup>12</sup> From the Portuguese *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, lit. 'Mozambican National Resistance'. RENAMO is a Mozambican political party and militant group founded with the active sponsorship of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in May 1977 from anti-communist dissidents opposed to Mozambique's ruling FRELIMO party. See (Sheldon et al., 1999). *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since independence*. Athens: Ohio University Press. pp. 117–120. ISBN 0-8214-1191-8.

<sup>13</sup> See Crisis Group interview, government official, Pemba, February 2021. (International Crisis Group, 2021)

Muslim community in Cabo Delgado was refused the elevated status of *assimilado*, mainly because the Portuguese culture and identity were highly influenced by Catholicism.

During the pre-independence era, the Portuguese administration even went so far as to deliberately associate themselves only with non-Muslim ethnic groups in Cabo Delgado (The Makua people over the Makonde who are a majority ethnic group in the north) (Von Sicard, 2008). This move created social fragmentation along ethno-religious lines which arguably persists to the present. In the 1960s Wahhabism arrived in Mozambique and was stretched by Mozambicans we had connections with Saudi Arabia Egypt and other Salafist movements. In 1998, the northern Sufi authority lost its power as the main Islamic authority in Mozambique after the creation of CISLAMO (Bonate, 2007). Which enjoys the support of the central government to this day. This led to further fragmentation and disillusionment, of the northern Sufi Muslims with the southern Salafi Muslims and the government whom they had had a testing and complicated relationship with from the time of the Portuguese colonization.

The role played by religion in the conflict is twofold. Mozambique is a secularist (Kaarsholm, 2015) country and has a policy of radical secularism. Secularism in this case refers to the institutional separation between church and public institutions (state). The Mozambican constitution in Article 54 provides for the right to practice religion freely or not to practice any religion. It also prohibits the discrimination of people based on religion. The constitution further prohibits faith-based political parties and the use of religious insignia in politics.

Northern Mozambique including the province of Cabo Delgado is a majority Muslim region (Bonate, 2008). As a result of the long history of the Islamic religion in Mozambique, the majority of Muslims in this part of the country are Sufi Muslims. According to (Bonate, 2009), the Muslims in this northern part of the country much like their region played an important part in the struggle for Mozambican liberation from the Portuguese, they were also instrumental in liberation movements.

In the 1980s, FRELIMO was looking to coopt parts of the Muslim community and gain connections with Arab States<sup>14</sup>. FRELIMO did this by allying with CISLAMO<sup>15</sup> a Salafi denomination civil organization in the 1980s. This meant that from the policy of radical secularism and separation of religion from state institutions, FRELIMO entered into a marriage of convenience with a religious group in furtherance of their own party agenda.

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<sup>14</sup> See (Bonate, 2008), "Muslim Religious Leadership in Post-Colonial Mozambique", South African Historical Journal, vol. 60, no. 4 (2008).

<sup>15</sup> From Portuguese *Conselho Islamico de Mocambique*, lit. 'Islamic Council of Mozambique'.



The result was that there was now Salafi Muslim influence in Mozambique working close with the government and funded by foreign states and charities. This was received as an insult to the old Sufi orders of northern Mozambique who had predated the Salafi denomination by some hundreds of years. This trend also led to the traditional Sufi orders of the north being challenged by CISLAMO and according to (Meservey, 2021), this trend is not purely a Mozambican phenomenon but rather a looming crisis for the future of the Islamic religion on the African continent.

The traditional Sufi orders had been in Mozambique for hundreds of years and had adopted practices to local customs<sup>16</sup>. In fact, according to (Kaarsholm, 2015), Muslims in Cabo Delgado have claimed to have felt so much marginalization from the FRELIMO government that at some point they felt that they rather support the nationalist movements and guerillas crossing in through the unsecured northern border from Tanzania.

### **1.3 Resource Curse<sup>17</sup> (Multinational Extractive Industry)**

In the past 10 years, the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique has gone through major economic, cultural, and social changes that can be linked to the discovery of rubies and gas fields. The exploration and extraction of these natural resources by Transnational Corporations (TNC) working in conjunction with the Mozambican government has affected the communities in Cabo Delgado negatively as well as has had negative effects on the natural environment. This development in Cabo Delgado is having the reverse effects on the TNCs and the Mozambican government and elites who have been at the receiving end of the economic benefits of the newly booming extractive industry of northern Mozambique.

These new venture of an extractive economy in northern Mozambique exists within a context of political violence and historical tensions between the region (northern Mozambique) and Maputo (the government). Prior to the emergence of the extraction processes, there was already a resurgence of past (historical) conflict between RENAMO who are ex-combatants and the Mozambican State Security

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<sup>16</sup> See Bonate, “Muslim Religious Leadership in Post-Colonial Mozambique”, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> The natural resources curse refers to the paradox that countries endowed with raw materials tend to have lower GDP per capita and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources. Angola, Congo and Nigeria, are good examples of economies well-endowed in natural resources that suffer widespread poverty. See (Limi Kouotou & Atangana Ondo, 2023) for more information on the phenomenon of resource curse specifically in Africa.

Forces under FRELIMO from 2013-2014 and 2015 – 2016. The conflict was followed by negotiations in 2016-2019 with an eventual Maputo Peace Agreement<sup>18</sup> as a result.

(Alberdi & Barroso, 2021) argue that in areas adjacent to extraction of natural resources by TNCs there exists a new form of violence - “newest wars”, and that this violence is usually less visible than in typical wars and furthermore, that this violence inflicted on the inhabitants hampers their (inhabitants) wellbeing, inflicts suffering as well as undermines the “formal peace” for a large part of society in their everyday lives. “Newest wars” as proposed by (Alberdi & Barroso, 2021) refers to wars that break out in areas where there is a newly booming extraction of natural resources by TNCs.

It can be summarized from the argument made by (Alberdi & Barroso, 2021) that the resource curse in northern Mozambique has become a serious grievance that has led to the insurgency by the Islamist militants who feel that the extractive industry has disturbed their peace and proven a violent and injury on their community (inhabitants) and the natural environment whilst at the same time, creating an unstable economic environment in the region and making the TNCs and Maputo (the government) rich.

It can furthermore be concluded that the extractive industry in Cabo Delgado has brought with it a new form of violence and that as a result of that violence, formal peace is difficult to achieve as the region is in a state of negative peace which according to (Galtung, 1964) refers to an absence of war and an absence of violence but not necessarily to mean that there is contentment.

## **2. Social integration as a conflict resolution tool**

The *UN-DESA Peace Dialogue in the Social Integration Process: An Alternative to violence and silence!* (UN-DESA/DSPD, 2005) is a strategy or framework that proposes the use of social integration in resolving conflict in a community country or organization. It is concerned with procedures capacities and institutions that can help to resolve social conflict in places such as Cabo Delgado and Mali in a peaceful and just way. This framework proposes social integration as a state and also as a process that can facilitate a flourishing peace or social cohesion that goes beyond negative peace (absence of conflict).

The working definition of social integration of the UN-DESA framework views social integration as a voluntary (it should never be imposed), multi-stakeholder process that is aimed at social transformation towards peace, just social relations (social cohesion), and institutions. The process as envisaged here is based on mutual understanding and accommodation by all parties to the conflict. The scope of the strategy includes societies that are fragmented or those with peace as well as. It spans the

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<sup>18</sup> Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, and the leader of Renamo, Ossufo Momade, in Maputo.

socio-political, socio-economic, and psycho-cultural domains. The strategy or framework prioritizes dialogue as the main tool to be used to foster a state of social integration or to bring about social cohesion. The framework formulates stages of social integration as stages of social relations.

The peace processes in Mali in the 1990s and in post-apartheid South Africa offer an example of how social integration can be used to bring an end to conflict and promote peace. Although the situation as it existed in Mali in the 1990s is different to the conflict in Mozambique today there are enough similarities between the two cases to justify a comparison of the two cases. Both countries experienced colonization by European countries, Mali by France (Hagberg & Körling, 2012), and Mozambique by Portugal. Both countries experienced economic declines that led to coup *d'états* and civil wars after independence and continue to struggle through cycles of violent coup *d'états* and civil wars and terrorism to the present.

Furthermore, both countries experience polarization between their remote northern territories and their central government in the South. They are multi-ethnic states that also have the hurdle of tribalism to overcome on top of the civil conflict. In Mali, a separatist war broke out between 1990 and 1996 in the north (Chauzal et al., 2015). The war was started by a small group of Tuareg who attacked a military post as a sign of rebellion. It is worthwhile to note that the Tuareg have been rebelling against the government from as far back as 1916 under French colonial rule and in 1963 against the newly formed independence government up to the present.

By 1990 the northern region and the Tuareg population had gone through a repressive military regime that marginalized them, social exclusion in government and army, inability to manage their local affairs according to their traditions, two devastating droughts first in 1972 to 1973, and 1983 to 1985, and insufficient relief efforts from the government. The Northern population felt their culture was misunderstood by the central government in the South and that they (the central government) didn't care about basic issues they were facing such as infrastructure for health, education, and communication as well as land and water rights. There was systematic neglect of the development of the north.

Much like has happened in Cabo Delgado, the young northern Tuareg men became radicalized and joined extremist groups in Libya (Islamic Legion and POLISARIO) (Lode, 2002). These young men later sought to use their experience and their militias to bring an end to the marginalization of their region in northern Mali through the use of force. The marginalization brought a sense of hopelessness to the youngest generations of Tuareg in the north. The same can be said about the young population in northern Mozambique. This led to the separatist war in 1990 and much like MDF and SAMIM's response to the

terrorism problem in Cabo Delgado, the Traore Government in Mali opted for a securitization and militarization solution against the insurgency.

The Tuareg insurgents had regional support (Northern solidarity) and the People's Movement Azawad. The Traore administration soon realized that a military solution was impossible thereby making a negotiated settlement more attractive the initial negotiation efforts were met with rejection from the northerners.

What led to concrete results in the conflict between Tuaregs and other northern Malian communities and the Traore government in the South was civilian involvement through civil society. The social integration peace process in northern Mali started with regional consultations that included the public in the debate for the country's future. These public consultations broke the political monopoly in the South and to an extent they decentralized the decision-making capacity and consolidated democratic rule.

The next step was the encouragement of peace-building measures by civil society that started in the form of inter-community meetings involving the negotiation of ceasefires by traditional and movement leaders. Traore's government went so far as to withdraw from the region in order to give civil society peace initiatives a chance to succeed. He also insisted that regional authorities were to refrain from interfering with civil society peacemaking activities. For its part, civil society forged ahead and held a series of self-managed inter-community meetings that created localized peace agreements that led to voluntary disbanding of movements, social reconciliation, and an end to local disputes.

Beyond the localized peace initiatives spearheaded by civil society in the north, the government started a program aimed at decommissioning weapons and reintegrating combatants into the communities. International organizations such as the UNDP saw this initiative and provided financial assistance to the government to run that program. In the end, the UN supervised a disarmament program that ended in the burning of more than 3000 arms from demobilized combatants in a giant open, "flame of peace" bonfire in Timbuktu. This event marked the end of the war and was a historical moment for modern Mali. The same thing can happen in Cabo Delgado.

## **F. Conclusion**

Deterrence alone as a strategy is not sufficient in resolving the situation in Cabo Delgado, in fact, deterrence seeks to preserve the status quo ante while social integration policies seek to change the status quo ante by identifying the underlying causes of the social conflict that is leading to the fragmentation of Mozambique and society. Deterrence is coercive by nature because it either coerces others not to act a certain way or compels them to comply in a way they otherwise would not have (Smelser et al., 2002).

SAMMIM is a military operation and takes the security approach, on the other hand, social integration efforts such as in Mali are multi-dimensional, civilian-based, and prioritize mediation between conflicting parties.

SAMMIM'S approach has thus far not yielded a formal agreement between Maputo and the north whereas social integration approaches such as envisaged in the UN-DESA framework would focus on stabilization efforts, quick impact projects as well as recovery projects. The peace process in Cabo Delgado must be people-centered, the traditional leaders of the communities must be included in addressing the issue of the resource curse and the issuing of extracting licenses on their land, an openness to negotiation with the local populace in Cabo Delgado will lend legitimacy and credibility to whatever compromise is reached between Maputo and the north.

Involvement and respect of the Sufi elders in the north, and the respect of their authority in the region as well as respect for their religion in general, will also engender trust and promote the radical secularism that the government ought to be practicing based on the provisions of the Mozambican constitution. Furthermore, the involvement of the disaffected youth in the improvement of the socio-economic problems will promote local ownership, and will furthermore encourage a need to protect the community from acts of terror by other community members. In addition, more political steps on the side of Maputo such as decentralizing certain aspects of governance in Cabo Delgado will go a long way towards building mutual trust. This step coupled with programs that address the needs of women and children will get the attention of the international community and result in possible international support.

Social integration is a social solution to a social problem (social conflict and fragmentation). A change in the attitude and language towards the North can go a long way towards ending the conflict as it once did in Mali in 1996. As Galtung asserts, the word "terrorist" is a lazy American invention and encourages people to stop thinking because upon hearing the word, they simply assume that the terrorist is a bad person. Social conflict is a normal process, social integration is a normal solution to a conflict and fragmentation that leads to social cohesion and meaningful lasting peace.

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