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Assessing Organizational Legitimacy of Multi Stakeholder Initiatives in the Forest Governance Policy in Indonesia: Insights from the Indonesian National Forestry Council

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Keywords: Indonesia; institutional; legitimacy; multi-stakeholder initiatives; National Forestry Council.




JEL Classification: O23, R11, G38.

Introduction
Increasingly complex forestry issues are increasingly dependent on expertise and knowledge in governance (Laraswati *et al.* 2022). The outcomes and lessons learned from forest management at the site level have motivated actors to work together to develop acceptable solutions based on fresh insights into challenging circumstances in policy formation (Maryudi, Nurchohat, and Gleason 2018). The paradigm shift in governance from government to governance makes the government more open in the process and implementation of policies, including forest governance (Ngatikh, Kumorotomo, and Retnandari 2020). The openness of this paradigm is an opportunity for many actors to be involved in governance, including in formulating forestry policies (Kaissa *et al.* 2017). The number of actors involved in the policy process means that there are many contested powers and interests to influence policy makers (Krott 2005). The contestation of actors that occurs in the policy process has

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JEL Classification: Q23; R11; G38.

Introduction

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an impact on the quality of the policies produced (Bettiza and Lewis 2020). Often the resulting policies are not based on evidence but based on power (Turnhout, *et al.* 2020). To stabilize the many interests of the actors who want to be involved in the policy process, a common institution is needed for the actors to express and contest (Arora-Jonsson, Brunsson and Hasse 2020). A forum that functions as a mediator and bridges the ongoing process of negotiating the interests of many actors into policy, one of which is a multi-stakeholder initiative organization (MSI) (Pek, Mena and Lyons 2022).

Multi-stakeholder initiative organization formed as a communicative institution between government and non-government actors in the policy process (Van Huijstee 2021; Yami, Barletti, and Larson 2021). MSI was formed to fill gaps in governance (Schuster and Mossig 2022), MSI must create or strengthen standards of behaviour that are expected even though they are not legally enforceable but have normative values that are 'socially binding' for members who are in them (Baccaro and Mele 2011). In the last few decades, various forms of MSI have emerged. The formation of MSIs may be linked to a variety of issues, including civil society's growing public discontent with various types of policies resulting from policies that are dominated by specific players (Baumann-Pauly, *et al.* 2017; Grabs and Garrett 2023).

The National Forestry Council (DKN) is a multi-stakeholder initiative organization formed as a collaborative forum for stakeholders to contribute to Indonesia's forest governance policy-making process. DKN has a strategic position as a partner of the government in policy formulation. DKN was formed as a manifestation of the mandate of Law No. 41 of 1999 on forestry. Because its members come from representatives of the parties (Government, NGOs, Academics, Society), as MSI, DKN functions to balance the interests and power brought by the actors so as to produce collective decisions in the form of policy advice on policy formulation. The problem becomes more complex when a collective decision as a result of negotiations between DKN actors is not fully heard and accepted as advice on policy formulation by policy makers. One of the reasons MSI falls into the power trap of certain individuals both inside and outside the organization is the poor legitimacy caused by its popularity and formalization (Wong 2014).

In this study, we examined one type of MSI in particular: DKN as MSI specialized in forestry. We are of the opinion that as an MSI that has received approval from the Indonesian Minister of Environment and Forestry, DKN has the best opportunity to fill gaps in forest governance. We analyze to gain a comprehensive understanding of how it is formed, how to define and enforce standards, how is accountability and implications for deliberative legitimacy in the policy process. Using the method of input and output legitimacy described by Mena and Palazzo (2012), we examine the validity of DKN inputs and outputs legitimacy.

1. Literature Review

The deliberative policy system in forest governance in Indonesia opens up opportunities for many actors with each regime to be taking part in the political process of developing policies, which in the end, politics among these regime actors results in regime policies (Maryudi and Sahide 2018). In the policy process, there is a social bargaining process to manage conflicts of interest (Krott 2005). Actors who come from different backgrounds each bring their interests to be negotiated in the contestation of policy making (Poppe, Leininger, and Wolff 2019). In deliberative policy, it means that many actors negotiate and contest to take part in the formulation of policies (Raynor, *et al.* 2022; Niessen, *et al.* 2019; Macq, Tancoigne and Strasser 2020). Many international environmental issues drive and influence the direction of national policies by bringing together various actors to initiate to form multi-stakeholder organizations (Liswanti, Tamara and Arwida 2023). The multi-stakeholder initiative organization formed is a form of deliberative policy in collaborating and involving actors in the policy process so that it is no longer exclusive to the government or certain actors (Zhang and Yuan 2019). Deliberative democracy requires that everyone subject to access a communicative discussion about a set of norms and how these rules are created and developed (Craig 2022; Erman 2022; Willis, Curato and Smith 2022).

Legitimacy is based on an actor's use of a process within a system that is not biased and does not violate policy or procedural standards. In terms of legitimacy, an actor considers a system's processes as unbiased procedural justice standards and meeting political. Legitimacy is the conviction that scientific and technological institutions are "fair" and appropriately consider relevant values, interests, worries, and particular circumstances from many viewpoints (Erman 2022; Cash, *et al.* 2005; Otsuka 2022). Determining the legitimacy of MSI presents its own set of challenges, Only an organized system of decision-making in a nation-democratic state can continually achieve democratic legitimacy (Barlow 2022; Reinecke and Donaghey 2022).

Mena and Palazzo (2012), provides a comprehensive summary of what MSI needs to have legitimacy. In their study, Mena and Palazzo made a number of requirements for input and output categories that MSI must meet in order to be considered legitimate. The input legitimacy consists of procedural fairness, inclusion,

transparency, and consensus orientation. Requirements for legitimacy output include efficacy, coverage, and enforcement. Mena and Palazzo provide a comprehensive summary of what MSI needs to have appropriate input legitimacy. The first requirement, inclusion, refers to the involvement of all appropriate stakeholders who have an interest in and are affected by the issue being addressed. In addition, it is important that all stakeholders involved in MSI have equal or proportionate representation and that all decisions are made through an inclusive process (Pek, Mena, and Lyons 2022).

The second requirement, procedural fairness, is based on how the decision-making process is completed within MSI and how stakeholders can influence decisions. Inclusivity refers to equal representation and presence of appropriate stakeholders, procedural fairness indicates how equally or fairly stakeholders can influence decisions. Consensus orientation is the third requirement and refers to MSI's ability to reach agreement on an issue. The nature of MSI, however, means that consensus may be difficult to achieve. The parties involved come from a variety of backgrounds and may have very different or even conflicting cultural beliefs or political and economic agendas. Because of these difficulties, gaining consensus among all parties may be a challenge. However, the decision-making approach must involve all stakeholders and conclusions must be consensual without any party holding a disproportionately dominant voting power. The final input legitimacy requirement of the Mena and Palazzo study concerns transparency. MSI's goal is to represent a number of different groups and people. For MSI to succeed and represent its stakeholders successfully and with legitimacy, transparency is essential. Transparency of all decision-making is important to ensure that the public is aware of any conclusions reached or operations carried out. In addition, it is important to disclose the process taken to arrive at any policy decision or conclusion. The public and other interested parties can then validate the appropriateness of any decisions, decision processes or actions taken by MSI.

Mena and Palazzo (2012) describe three additional requirements that are essential for MSI to achieve output legitimacy. The first requirement relates to coverage. Coverage refers to the number of stakeholders or assets involved in MSI. Examples include the number of stakeholders involved, or the percentage of their representation. It is important that as many relevant stakeholders as possible are involved in MSI to make it appear legitimate. Specifically, for companies, Mena and Palazzo suggest that coverage encourages output legitimacy and that having a large number or majority of stakeholders involved in MSI may mean that unaffiliated institutions will be at a competitive disadvantage.

The second output legitimacy requirement is the efficacy or the extent to which the MSI rule effectively responds to the policy problem it seeks to address. MSI may not be an effective solution to certain problems for a number of reasons. The reasons may include: poor participation in MSI; MSI's structure or governance may not be conducive or successful in providing solutions to problems; or MSI itself may not be the right or effective answer to a problem. MSI must also consider all stakeholders involved and ensure that targets are achievable for members whose resources may not be as large as others. The final output legitimacy requirement focuses on enforcement capability. These requirements refer to MSI's ability to ensure that its members extent with complies the rules and they can enforce the rules. The lack of enforceability of MSI can substantially affect its legitimacy and is often the main argument against its use. MSI must ensure that there is an appropriate monitoring system in place and that the impact of a lack of compliance with rules and guidelines has effective consequences.

2. Methodology

We start this research by reviewing activity journals, documents, meeting minutes and reports relevant to DKN before classifying their legitimacy. We also conducted semi-structured and informal interviews as well as observations of DKN constituent members. We use purposive sampling with a snowball model to identify respondents who can provide comprehensive information. Key informant interviews came from 5 DKN constituents, each representing the government, business, NGOs, the community and academia as members in it. We recognize that such an insider's perspective is prone to bias because the researcher is not directly involved and there is no conflict of interest whatsoever in DKN's operations. To avoid bias we triangulated the data (Valencia 2022), by complementing and balancing our point of view with publicly available DKN resources and additional interviews with relevant stakeholders. The interview questions given focused on the MSI legitimacy criteria approach in the deliberative policies offered by Mena and Palazzo (2012). Furthermore, Mena and Palazzo (2012), outlines three requirements for legitimacy output (coverage, organizational efficacy, and enforcement) and four criteria for legitimacy inputs (inclusion, consensus orientation, procedural fairness, and transparency). The legitimacy criteria and their explanations are described in table 1.

Table 1. MSI's Democratic Legitimacy Criteria

Dimensions	Criteria	Definition	Question Key
Input	Inclusion	Involvement of stakeholders affected by the issue in the structures and processes of the MSI	Are the involved stakeholders representative for the issue at stake? Are important stakeholders excluded from the process?
	Procedural fairness	Neutralization of power differences in decision-making structures	Does each of these categories of stakeholder have a valid voice in decision-making processes?
	Consensual orientation	Culture of cooperation and reasonable disagreement	To what extent does the MSI promote mutual agreement among participants?
	Transparency	Transparency of structures, processes and results	To what extent are decision making and standard-setting processes transparent? To what extent are the performance of the participating corporations and the evaluation of that performance transparent?
Output	Coverage	Number of rule-targets following the rules	How many rule-targets are complying with the rules?
	Efficacy	Fit of the rules to the issue	To what extent do the rules address the issue at hand?
	Enforcement	Practical implementation of the rules and their verification procedures	Is compliance verified and non-compliance sanctioned?

Source: adapted from Mena and Palazzo (2012)

3. Result

Institutional DKN as MSI's in a Dilemma

Indonesian forest governance has changed drastically since the 1999 reform, the same as in other sectors. Because in the New Order era, forestry was part of a government institution whose focus was only on government interests and company interests. Reform calls for all sectors to change including forestry. During the reform era, movements emerged to accommodate stakeholders to make changes to the forestry sector, which became a very important prerequisite for the direction of forestry to change, which was widely discussed, much discussed at the Indonesian global communication forum. Three things are important when reform is the main concern of the parties, the first is that all government policies must go through a multi-stakeholder process and encourage forest management that can provide benefits that can be received by the community as one of the characteristics of good governance, the second was to make changes from the old forestry law to forestry law 41 and the third was to form an institution capable of balancing the policies of the ministry of forestry which was then set forth in Law no. 41 of 1999 the "forestry observer forum" as the forerunner of the National Forestry Council (DKN). As a multi-stakeholder initiative organization born from the common view that it is necessary to form an organization capable of balancing the government, DKN has become a forum for gathering the aspirations of forestry actors to participate in the formulation of forestry policies. The first five years at the beginning of its founding, the enthusiasm and militancy of its constituents showed the idealism of DKN as an organization capable of playing a role as a balancer in governance and in the forestry policy process. DKN at that time was seen as a model of a strong and promising multi-stakeholder governance forum as an entry point for deliberative forestry policy processes. One proof of the public's trust in DKN at that time was that it was easy to get funding to support DKN work programs that were independent and had no dependency from any party. In contrast to the results of the current in-depth case study on DKN (figure 1), we found that far from being a strong institution, DKN is currently very fragile. This fragility is caused by various problems, especially institutional problems because when the DKN was formed, since the beginning this institution was never discussed in detail, what the DKN institution would be like. After DKN is formed, the problem is who manages DKN, what is the institutional status? who will certify the DKN institutionally?

No	Informant Code	Name Code	Position
8	Informan 8	TKS	DKN Presidium Council constituency of NGO Santiri Foundation
9	Informan 9	RH	DKN Presidium Council constituency of NGO KKI WARSI
10	Informan 10	DR	DKN Presidium Council constituency of NGO KEHATI and Bisnis
11	Informan 11	DV	DKN Presidium Council constituency of Bisnis
12	Informan 12	DYN	DKN Presidium Council constituency of Bisnis
13	Informan 13	AKR	DKN Presidium Council constituency of Government
14	Informan 14	AJ	DKN Presidium Council constituency of Government (Founder)
15	Informan 15	HH	DKN Presidium Council constituency of Government
16	Informan 16	AST	DKN Presidium Council constituency of NGO (Founder)
17	Informan 17	JG	DKN Presidium Council Constituents of Community (Jabalnusra Region)
18	Informan 18	ARN	DKN Presidium Council Constituents of Community (Sulawesi Region)
19	Informan 19	MMP	DKN Presidium Council Constituents of Community (Maluku Region)
20	Informan 20	HS	NGO Javlec
21	Informan 21	MAM	NGO FKKM
22	Informan 22	ME	NGO Pijar Lentera
23	Informan 23	AKU	Lecturer in Forestry UNKHAIR
24	Informan 24	GGP	Lecturer in Forestry, University of Muhammadiyah Malang

Inclusion

Inclusion relates to the involvement of stakeholders associated with MSI and whether or not they represent the group most affected by the goals and decisions made by an initiative. It is expected that the presence of stakeholders as members in MSI is balanced and that each stakeholder group representative can influence decision making rather than merely as an observer or consultant Mena and Palazzo (2012).


Based on the draft articles of association and by-laws (ART) article 3 of the DKN concerning the formation and governance of the organization.

“DKN constituents are stakeholders in the forestry sector consisting of:

- 1) Government and Regional Government are agencies/institutions/agencies within the scope of the government and regional government that are in charge of and/or have links with the forestry sector.*
- 2) Local communities living in and around forest areas are indigenous peoples and local communities who in their daily lives have a direct relationship with the forestry sector.*
- 3) Forestry business actors are forestry business entities, both large-scale, medium-scale and small-scale (Private/BUMN/BUMD/Cooperative) which have forestry work fields and other fields that have direct links to the forestry sector.*
- 4) NGOs are non-governmental organizations/institutions that have links with the development and management of the forestry and environmental sectors.*
- 5) Observers are activists of individuals and/or organizations, including students, retirees, trade unions, professional organizations that have concern and contribute to the development of the forestry sector.*
- 6) Academics are teaching staff in higher and secondary education institutions in the forestry sector and other fields that have a direct relationship with forestry.*
- 7) Researchers are individuals who work in research institutions/institutions in the field of forestry and other fields that have a direct link with forestry.”*

The involvement of the parties in the DKN includes 5 constituents who are representatives from the government, business, NGOs, the community and academia. Management period I the composition of the percentage of DKN members consists of 7 people (22.6%), local community rooms 7 people (22.6%), forestry business actors 7 people (22.6%), NGO rooms/observers 5 people (16.1 %) and room for academics and researchers 5 people (16.1%). The 2nd management period of the composition became more even with each room represented by 7 constituents. The composition of the DKN from several stakeholders comes from initiatives that are formally organized and are characterized by a democratic multi-stakeholder governance structure so that from the beginning of its formation there has been no change in composition. The DKN structure is based on a percentage of the number of representatives from each of the same rooms, aiming at fairness in the number and weight of votes in decision making, both by deliberation and voting.

Figure 2. DKN Constituent Representation



Interview results with DKN members did not reveal any serious problems with the group's structure or membership. On the basis of the draft AD/ART which has been confirmed in interviews, decision making is inclusive, and each stakeholder group representative believes that they are heard and have influence within DKN. Each constituency has effective participation from stakeholders coming from relevant organizations in accordance with the AD/ART this shows inclusion as defined Mena and Palazzo (2012), Each constituency involved in the deliberations effectively always communicates issues or opinions raised from the stakeholder groups they represent.

Procedural Fairness

Procedural fairness requirements refer to whether each stakeholder group has a say and can influence decision making. Like inclusion, the DKN allows each constituent to raise relevant issues according to the stakeholders represented and have an equal voice when making decisions. The rights of the DKN constituents are stated in the draft articles of association article 11.


"Article 11 Member Rights

- 1. Members have the right to participate in the congress, unless otherwise provided for by the Rules of the Congress;*
- 2. Members have the right to provide suggestions and suggestions related to programs and activities in order to achieve the vision, mission, goals and functions of DKN;*
- 3. Members have the right to receive information relating to all DKN activities;*
- 4. Members have voting rights in the decision-making process, as well as the right to vote and be elected in the process of preparing the DKN organizational structure through the Constituent Chamber;"*

Each stakeholder group or constituent chamber within the DKN has one vote and decisions are made by consensus. Each room often holds intense discussions about a problem which is finally resolved by deliberation to become a room vote. Decisions in the constituent chambers are made by consensus or by majority vote. The results of the interviews revealed that decisions are always made after discussion or debate, and it was noted that these discussions never reached a dead end that forced a vote. The results of each room's decisions are then brought into a large discussion forum together with representatives of other stakeholders to be negotiated into organizational decisions.

Figure 3. Statement of the lobbying process for DKN members

Is there a lobbying process in DKN between members and policy makers both personally and institutionally...Yes or NO? (Provide an explanation of the answer options)
16 answer



“The DKN work meeting cannot be held if there is one constituent representative who is not present at the meeting not based on a quorum but based on the representation of stakeholder constituents. In terms of having an equal voice, in meetings when making decisions every decision we make is always based on consensus”.

Some of the constituents interviewed commented that sometimes one group of stakeholders may need to compromise through a lobbying process with other stakeholders if their proposals have not been facilitated/accepted, but even if they are ultimately not accepted, the constituent members accept the final decision as a collective decision. They stated that DKN is a fair platform, and every stakeholder group is treated equally when decisions are made. All the constituent representatives interviewed commented that they were comfortable raising any issues related to the group of stakeholders represented. They believe that everyone's interests are heard, and they feel empowered when it comes to making decisions.

Consensual Orientation


Consensus Orientation or consensus orientation is a principle of good governance which states that any decision must be made through a process of deliberation (Barlow 2022) The method of making decisions by consensus will bind most of the components that consult in an effort to realize the effectiveness of implementing decisions (Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk 2022; Adom and Simatele 2022). DKN is formed based on the common principles of various forestry stakeholders who come together to form a community organization as a partner of the government in forestry governance. It is not easy to unite various interests into one collective decision. It takes a common understanding by all DKN constituents that achieving a high level of consensus orientation requires cooperation even though there are differences of opinion in the negotiation of interests.

In the draft articles of association of the organization, articles 28 to 31 concerning DKN decision-making include an explanation of the importance of each stakeholder group being treated as an "equal partner".

Some important points are taken from the draft articles of association articles 28 to 31 on how DKN prioritizes agreement in decision making:

- a) The decision-making process prioritizes deliberation to reach a consensus.
- b) If the deliberations to reach a consensus cannot produce an agreement, then the voting method will be adopted.
- c) Each Constituent Chamber has a weighted quota in the process of determining decisions, as follows:
 - 1) The Chamber of the Government/Regional Government has a quota of 20% (twenty-four percent) of the total vote value
 - 2) The Chamber of Indigenous and Local Peoples has a quota of 30% (twenty-four percent) of the overall vote value
 - 3) The Chamber of Forestry Business Actors has a quota of 20% (twenty-four percent) of the overall vote value
 - 4) The NGO/Observer Chamber has a quota of 15% (fourteen percent) of the overall vote value
 - 5) The Academic/Research Chamber has a quota of 15% (fourteen percent) of the overall vote value

Figure 4. Participation democracy of DKN



Consensus-based decision-making is a core element in multi-stakeholder processes (Maring 2022). Collaboration and cooperation with a view to reaching a general agreement among all DKN members on all decisions is a fundamental part of the organizational governance process. The minutes of the DKN meeting show that during the discussions that took place there was effective cooperation between each constituent. The results of the interviews also stated that DKN members were satisfied with the decision-making procedures and many topics were raised and 'intense discussions' occurred before decision making. There is no information on disputes

between interest groups in terms of reaching an agreement. All respondents stated that they agreed that every discussion in the decision-making process was carried out by consensus rather than by voting. The results of the interviews show that there is no domination by one particular stakeholder using disproportionate power in the decision-making process.

Transparency

As an organization that represents various parties, DKN is required to always be transparent in carrying out every activity. DKN conducts transparency in the form of an accountability mechanism with an open reporting model as a form of accountability to the public and reports to all groups to fulfil the rights of each member to access accurate information. In addition, all DKN activities, decisions, and financial conditions are always well documented and reported annually through regular annual meetings.

Transparency of DKN as MSI is very important so that the public can monitor DKN activities and determine the legitimacy of DKN as an organization. Transparency is a principle that protects the rights of the community (members) to receive access to accurate, correct, and non-discriminatory information regarding the functioning of an organization and the achievements achieved by the organization while protecting the rights of individuals and groups.

The DKN's draft articles of association include transparency in financial reporting and organizational decisions through public spaces, for example through websites and online news. Based on the results of the interviews, all informants said that every DKN activity and decision was well documented, and they were happy with the transparency of DKN. Annual financial reports are routinely submitted through an annual meeting that is held.

Figure 5. Accountability mechanisms in DKN

what is the accountability mechanism: reporting mechanism to members/constituents.
 Question: What is the DKN performance reporting model?(Provide an explanation of the answer options)
 16 answer





Figure 6. Mechanism of financial reporting in DKN

what is the DKN financial reporting model(Provide an explanation of the answer options)
 16 answer




DKN Output Legitimacy

Output legitimacy analysis is carried out by analyzing program and activity reports released by DKN, the data obtained includes meeting minutes and news reports published through the news with a focus on the output legitimacy a framework created by Mena and Palazzo in the analysis of MSI legitimacy and effectiveness. With regard to MSI, output legitimacy is a term for the extent that an initiative effectively solves the problem they seek to address. Three broad requirements were constructed by Mena and Palazzo to determine the legitimacy output including coverage, efficacy, and enforceability.

Depending on the structure and purpose, the definition of scope for each MSI can vary greatly. Mena and Palazzo define scope as the sum of MSI's stakeholders and assets. For MSI to be considered legitimate, as many relevant stakeholders as possible must be involved. According to Mena and Palazzo, scope promotes the legitimacy of outputs, and a large number or majority of prominent stakeholders participating in MSI may result in a competitive disadvantage for unaffiliated stakeholders. Potential DKN coverage based on constituents represented by Participating Businesses (APHI) (± 200), Universities with Forestry Faculties/Departments (± 50), indigenous people's organizations (± 2371), and NGOs (± 52) divided into 7 regions.


Figure 7. The potential scope of DKN policy implementation



Efficacy is defined as how well the rules or in the case of DKN, rules, and outputs are in accordance with the problems faced and how well DKN addresses the problems and influences policy. DKN input suggestions are largely determined by the response of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. So far, DKN has not been able to provide anything that influences policy. The problem of institutional status and quality of human resources in it greatly affects the performance of DKN, the hope of becoming a power balancing policy cannot work well. DKN's work mostly carries out government tasks, initiatives are no longer a priority in work programs. The positive influence that can be given is limited as a program implementing partner, while at the level of evaluation of DKN policies it has not been able to give much influence.

Figure 8. Influence of DKN in Forestry Policy Process

What is the influence of DKN in the policy process?(Has DKN ever produced advice which was then produced into policy?(Provide an explanation of the answer options)
16 answer



Enforcement is understood as MSI's ability to make certain that the laws/policies they make are followed and implemented. Until now, DKN advice has not been fully adopted by policymakers to become a policy. The voluntary and non-binding nature of MSI generally has a hard time enforcing policies. Because it has not yet entered the level of formulating policies due to institutional problems, aspects of enforcing DKN policy products cannot yet be measured on organizational independence DKN inclusiveness in the policy process is in the position of program implementer.

In obtaining legitimate legitimacy, it is not enough to just use DKN's input legitimacy criteria, output legitimacy is also an important part to be used as a standard because it relates to the implementation of DKN's work in representing all parties affected by forestry policies. Output legitimacy describes the extent to which DKN contributes to creating a policy according to a problem that includes various parties. As a counterweight to the

government, DKN failed to gain output legitimacy. DKN has not been able to contribute to providing advice or suggestions that can influence a policy. In several cases, DKN has also provided advice in policy-making, but this has not yet materialized into a policy. There is no policy that is the result of DKN advice, so DKN itself is said to have failed in obtaining output legitimacy, because all output legitimacy criteria, including coverage, efficacy, and enforcement cannot be carried out by DKN. This condition, of course, greatly reduced the credibility of DKN as a counterbalance to the government and then questioned its existence as an institution that represented various groups but was unable to produce a policy product that was in accordance with the interests of the various parties represented.

Even though it can fulfil input legitimacy, as a whole DKN cannot fulfil the legitimacy requirements because it does not fulfil the output legitimacy criteria. DKN can involve various parties in discussing every public problem it represents but is unable to have a real impact in solving these problems through a policy. Various problems in the institutional system are the cause of DKN's difficulties in enforcing a policy. The fundamental problem in the institutional status of DKN is mainly the limited financial resources which result in the dependence of DKN on government funding. With these limitations, DKN is not flexible in carrying out program agendas. It often happens that DKN programs are contributions from the activities of individual members who come from their home institutions because they happen to be members of DKN and then are recognized as DKN programs. Of course, for members who do not have the resource capacity and then expect to play a role in DKN, it will be difficult and tend to be passive.

Discussion

This study has explored the social relations indicated by DKN as MSI to gain insight into the legitimacy of DKN as a type of MSI, namely the special forestry MSI which was formed as a counterweight to the ministry of forestry. The success of DKN in gaining input and output legitimacy is the foundation of DKN's legitimacy. DKN has successfully executed all the requirements, including inclusion, procedural fairness, consensus orientation, and transparency, to achieve the degree of input legitimacy. DKN has a balance in representing the groups most affected by various forestry policies. Constituents in DKN consist of various parties who can influence each decision by communicating problems effectively and efficiently from the group of stakeholders represented. Government, Business, and Community Constituents are representatives with the highest number of members, while Academic Constituents and NGOs have a smaller number of representatives to carry out the function as a counterweight to achieve fairness in the number and weight of votes in making decisions by consensus deliberation or voting.

With heterogeneous representation, all DKN constituents are treated in a balanced way in voicing opinions to address the various issues represented. Every decision made by DKN is the result of recommendations from each room involved in the DKN work meeting. Each chamber has its own proposals originating from the results of internal discussions regarding the various issues they represent. The result of the discussion is a chamber decision which is then discussed in a larger forum with other constituents to produce a collective final decision. In DKN work meetings, each constituent has an equal voice in negotiating or compromising through a lobbying process to produce a decision that is by the interests represented. If one of the constituent representatives cannot attend the DKN working meeting, then the meeting cannot be held. This is done to create procedural justice in the process of determining decisions and to create a sense of trust between constituents in representing all public interests so that consensus-building becomes easier to implement.

With different backgrounds, every decision taken by DKN is a consensus from various parties through deliberations for consensus as an effort to realize effectiveness in decision making. DKN constituents have different goals and interests in carrying out their function as a counterweight to the government. In response to this, every DKN policy and decision is always carried out in deliberation by considering various inputs from all representatives present at the work meeting. Through the process of deliberation, decision-making is not dominated by one party and can minimize disputes between stakeholders because it is a form of joint decision (Niessen 2019). Although not all proposals are facilitated, each constituent accepts the final decision as a collective decision because everyone's interests are heard and are always empowered in the procedure for determining decisions.

Conclusion

Institutional problems and the quality of constituent representation greatly affect DKN performance. These problems have various implications, especially on legitimacy, especially on the legitimacy of inputs and outputs. The legitimacy analysis including input and output reveals the successes and failures of how DKN operates as a

national initiative multi-stakeholder organization. DKN has succeeded in fulfilling all the criteria as an institution that has high input legitimacy. DKN involves various parties affected by forestry policies and is able to cooperate effectively in every decision-making while maintaining the rights of each of its constituents. On the other hand, DKN does not have output legitimacy in carrying out its function as a counterweight to the government. With a diverse number of constituent representatives, DKN is unable to fulfil every output legitimacy criterion. DKN has not been able to provide advice or suggestions which are then adopted into a policy. Coupled with the problem of limited DKN financial resources, it results in high dependence on government funding in carrying out each of its activities. Success in fundraising is strongly influenced by the capacity of the management and its members. The continuity of the management relay needs to be prepared by the management beforehand so that there is no breakup with partner institutions, especially with donor agencies.

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